Abstract:Autonomous agents are moving beyond simple retrieval tasks to become economic actors that invoke APIs, sequence workflows, and make real-time decisions. As this shift accelerates, API providers need request-level monetization with programmatic spend governance. The HTTP 402 protocol addresses this by treating payment as a first-class protocol event, but most implementations rely on cryptocurrency rails. In many deployment contexts, especially countries with strong real-time fiat systems like UPI, this assumption is misaligned with regulatory and infrastructure realities. We present APEX, an implementation-complete research system that adapts HTTP 402-style payment gating to UPI-like fiat workflows while preserving policy-governed spend control, tokenized access verification, and replay resistance. We implement a challenge-settle-consume lifecycle with HMAC-signed short-lived tokens, idempotent settlement handling, and policy-aware payment approval. The system uses FastAPI, SQLite, and Python standard libraries, making it transparent, inspectable, and reproducible. We evaluate APEX across three baselines and six scenarios using sample sizes 2-4x larger than initial experiments (N=20-40 per scenario). Results show that policy enforcement reduces total spending by 27.3% while maintaining 52.8% success rate for legitimate requests. Security mechanisms achieve 100% block rate for both replay attacks and invalid tokens with low latency overhead (19.6ms average). Multiple trial runs show low variance across scenarios, demonstrating high reproducibility with 95% confidence intervals. The primary contribution is a controlled agent-payment infrastructure and reference architecture that demonstrates how agentic access monetization can be adapted to fiat systems without discarding security and policy guarantees.
Abstract:AI agents that build user interfaces on the fly assembling buttons, forms, and data displays from structured protocol payloads are becoming common in production systems. The trouble is that a payload can pass every schema check and still trick a user: a button might say "View invoice" while its hidden action wipes an account, or a display widget might quietly bind to an internal salary field. Current defenses stop at syntax; they were never built to catch this kind of behavioral mismatch. We built AegisUI to study exactly this gap. The framework generates structured UI payloads, injects realistic attacks into them, extracts numeric features, and benchmarks anomaly detectors end-to-end. We produced 4000 labeled payloads (3000 benign, 1000 malicious) spanning five application domains and five attack families: phishing interfaces, data leakage, layout abuse, manipulative UI, and workflow anomalies. From each payload we extracted 18 features covering structural, semantic, binding, and session dimensions, then compared three detectors: Isolation Forest (unsupervised), a benign-trained autoencoder (semi-supervised), and Random Forest (supervised). On a stratified 80/20 split, Random Forest scored best overall (accuracy 0.931, precision 0.980, recall 0.740, F1 0.843, ROC-AUC 0.952). The autoencoder came second (F1 0.762, ROC-AUC 0.863) and needs no malicious labels at training time, which matters when deploying a new system that lacks attack history. Per-attack-type analysis showed that layout abuse is easiest to catch while manipulative UI payloads are hardest. All code, data, and configurations are released for full reproducibility.