Critical windows: non-asymptotic theory for feature emergence in diffusion models

We develop theory to understand an intriguing property of diffusion models for image generation that we term critical windows. Empirically, it has been observed that there are narrow time intervals in sampling during which particular features of the final image emerge, e.g. the image class or background color (Ho et al., 2020b; Georgiev et al., 2023; Raya & Ambrogioni, 2023; Sclocchi et al., 2024; Biroli et al., 2024). While this is advantageous for interpretability as it implies one can localize properties of the generation to a small segment of the trajectory, it seems at odds with the continuous nature of the diffusion. We propose a formal framework for studying these windows and show that for data coming from a mixture of strongly log-concave densities, these windows can be provably bounded in terms of certain measures of inter- and intra-group separation. We also instantiate these bounds for concrete examples like well-conditioned Gaussian mixtures. Finally, we use our bounds to give a rigorous interpretation of diffusion models as hierarchical samplers that progressively "decide" output features over a discrete sequence of times. We validate our bounds with synthetic experiments. Additionally, preliminary experiments on Stable Diffusion suggest critical windows may serve as a useful tool for diagnosing fairness and privacy violations in real-world diffusion models.

Pandora's White-Box: Increased Training Data Leakage in Open LLMs

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over $50\%$ (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only $3$ epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.

MoPe: Model Perturbation-based Privacy Attacks on Language Models

Recent work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can unintentionally leak sensitive information present in their training data. In this paper, we present Model Perturbations (MoPe), a new method to identify with high confidence if a given text is in the training data of a pre-trained language model, given white-box access to the models parameters. MoPe adds noise to the model in parameter space and measures the drop in log-likelihood at a given point $x$, a statistic we show approximates the trace of the Hessian matrix with respect to model parameters. Across language models ranging from $70$M to $12$B parameters, we show that MoPe is more effective than existing loss-based attacks and recently proposed perturbation-based methods. We also examine the role of training point order and model size in attack success, and empirically demonstrate that MoPe accurately approximate the trace of the Hessian in practice. Our results show that the loss of a point alone is insufficient to determine extractability -- there are training points we can recover using our method that have average loss. This casts some doubt on prior works that use the loss of a point as evidence of memorization or unlearning.