Output Type Before Quality: A Standards-Derived XAI Admissibility Rubric for Autonomous-Driving Safety

Safety standards for ML-based autonomous driving specify the kind of evidence an assurance case must contain (directed cause-and-effect chains, quantified interventional effects, named root-cause variables), yet the XAI literature is organised by output type and technique family (saliency maps, feature attribution, counterfactuals, causal graphs, language traces). SHAP, the most-recommended ADS XAI method, returns a ranked feature list that no implementation effort can convert into a directed chain (Fig.1). We name this mismatch the evidence-type gap. From AMLAS, ISO 26262, ISO21448, ISO/PAS 8800 we derive 19 testable evidentiary criteria across 7 lifecycle stages with representative clause-cited derivations and score six XAI method classes structurally. Causal XAI emerges as structurally required to satisfy the derived criteria at three stages: hazard identification (+62% rubric gap), incident investigation (+50%), and data management (+50%); the verdict set is stable across thresholds T in (0%, 50%]$ and survives a worst-case single-cell flip down to T = 25%. At the remaining four stages, correlational or language-based methods are comparable or sufficient. The rubric identifies structural admissibility (necessary but not sufficient for compliance): an admissible method's specific output content may still be wrong, and validating that fidelity (the edges a fitted SCM produces, the cause a trace names) is the open assurance challenge. A single-VLA proof of concept on 1,996 real-world driving clips (79,840 rows, ten splits) is consistent with each method's observed output type matching its rubric prediction. XAI method selection for ADS safety assurance should be driven by lifecycle-stage evidence demand, not by method popularity.

HySafe-AI: Hybrid Safety Architectural Analysis Framework for AI Systems: A Case Study

AI has become integral to safety-critical areas like autonomous driving systems (ADS) and robotics. The architecture of recent autonomous systems are trending toward end-to-end (E2E) monolithic architectures such as large language models (LLMs) and vision language models (VLMs). In this paper, we review different architectural solutions and then evaluate the efficacy of common safety analyses such as failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). We show how these techniques can be improved for the intricate nature of the foundational models, particularly in how they form and utilize latent representations. We introduce HySAFE-AI, Hybrid Safety Architectural Analysis Framework for AI Systems, a hybrid framework that adapts traditional methods to evaluate the safety of AI systems. Lastly, we offer hints of future work and suggestions to guide the evolution of future AI safety standards.