Many state-of-the-art reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms typically assume that the environment is an ergodic Markov Decision Process (MDP). In contrast, the field of universal reinforcement learning (URL) is concerned with algorithms that make as few assumptions as possible about the environment. The universal Bayesian agent AIXI and a family of related URL algorithms have been developed in this setting. While numerous theoretical optimality results have been proven for these agents, there has been no empirical investigation of their behavior to date. We present a short and accessible survey of these URL algorithms under a unified notation and framework, along with results of some experiments that qualitatively illustrate some properties of the resulting policies, and their relative performance on partially-observable gridworld environments. We also present an open-source reference implementation of the algorithms which we hope will facilitate further understanding of, and experimentation with, these ideas.
In recent years, work has been done to develop the theory of General Reinforcement Learning (GRL). However, there are few examples demonstrating these results in a concrete way. In particular, there are no examples demonstrating the known results regarding gener- alised discounting. We have added to the GRL simulation platform AIXIjs the functionality to assign an agent arbitrary discount functions, and an environment which can be used to determine the effect of discounting on an agent's policy. Using this, we investigate how geometric, hyperbolic and power discounting affect an informed agent in a simple MDP. We experimentally reproduce a number of theoretical results, and discuss some related subtleties. It was found that the agent's behaviour followed what is expected theoretically, assuming appropriate parameters were chosen for the Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) planning algorithm.
Function optimisation is a major challenge in computer science. The No Free Lunch theorems state that if all functions with the same histogram are assumed to be equally probable then no algorithm outperforms any other in expectation. We argue against the uniform assumption and suggest a universal prior exists for which there is a free lunch, but where no particular class of functions is favoured over another. We also prove upper and lower bounds on the size of the free lunch.
We discuss a variant of Thompson sampling for nonparametric reinforcement learning in a countable classes of general stochastic environments. These environments can be non-Markov, non-ergodic, and partially observable. We show that Thompson sampling learns the environment class in the sense that (1) asymptotically its value converges to the optimal value in mean and (2) given a recoverability assumption regret is sublinear.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.
How can we design good goals for arbitrarily intelligent agents? Reinforcement learning (RL) is a natural approach. Unfortunately, RL does not work well for generally intelligent agents, as RL agents are incentivised to shortcut the reward sensor for maximum reward -- the so-called wireheading problem. In this paper we suggest an alternative to RL called value reinforcement learning (VRL). In VRL, agents use the reward signal to learn a utility function. The VRL setup allows us to remove the incentive to wirehead by placing a constraint on the agent's actions. The constraint is defined in terms of the agent's belief distributions, and does not require an explicit specification of which actions constitute wireheading.
Any agent that is part of the environment it interacts with and has versatile actuators (such as arms and fingers), will in principle have the ability to self-modify -- for example by changing its own source code. As we continue to create more and more intelligent agents, chances increase that they will learn about this ability. The question is: will they want to use it? For example, highly intelligent systems may find ways to change their goals to something more easily achievable, thereby `escaping' the control of their designers. In an important paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that goal preservation is a fundamental drive of any intelligent system, since a goal is more likely to be achieved if future versions of the agent strive towards the same goal. In this paper, we formalise this argument in general reinforcement learning, and explore situations where it fails. Our conclusion is that the self-modification possibility is harmless if and only if the value function of the agent anticipates the consequences of self-modifications and use the current utility function when evaluating the future.
This paper establishes for the first time the predictive performance of speed priors and their computational complexity. A speed prior is essentially a probability distribution that puts low probability on strings that are not efficiently computable. We propose a variant to the original speed prior (Schmidhuber, 2002), and show that our prior can predict sequences drawn from probability measures that are estimable in polynomial time. Our speed prior is computable in doubly-exponential time, but not in polynomial time. On a polynomial time computable sequence our speed prior is computable in exponential time. We show better upper complexity bounds for Schmidhuber's speed prior under the same conditions, and that it predicts deterministic sequences that are computable in polynomial time; however, we also show that it is not computable in polynomial time, and the question of its predictive properties for stochastic sequences remains open.
How could we solve the machine learning and the artificial intelligence problem if we had infinite computation? Solomonoff induction and the reinforcement learning agent AIXI are proposed answers to this question. Both are known to be incomputable. In this paper, we quantify this using the arithmetical hierarchy, and prove upper and corresponding lower bounds for incomputability. We show that AIXI is not limit computable, thus it cannot be approximated using finite computation. Our main result is a limit-computable {\epsilon}-optimal version of AIXI with infinite horizon that maximizes expected rewards.
A big open question of algorithmic information theory is the choice of the universal Turing machine (UTM). For Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff induction we have invariance theorems: the choice of the UTM changes bounds only by a constant. For the universally intelligent agent AIXI (Hutter, 2005) no invariance theorem is known. Our results are entirely negative: we discuss cases in which unlucky or adversarial choices of the UTM cause AIXI to misbehave drastically. We show that Legg-Hutter intelligence and thus balanced Pareto optimality is entirely subjective, and that every policy is Pareto optimal in the class of all computable environments. This undermines all existing optimality properties for AIXI. While it may still serve as a gold standard for AI, our results imply that AIXI is a relative theory, dependent on the choice of the UTM.