TOSSS: a CVE-based Software Security Benchmark for Large Language Models

With their increasing capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are now used across many industries. They have become useful tools for software engineers and support a wide range of development tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in software development workflows, a critical question arises: are LLMs good at software security? At the same time, organizations worldwide invest heavily in cybersecurity to reduce exposure to disruptive attacks. The integration of LLMs into software engineering workflows may introduce new vulnerabilities and weaken existing security efforts. We introduce TOSSS (Two-Option Secure Snippet Selection), a benchmark that measures the ability of LLMs to choose between secure and vulnerable code snippets. Existing security benchmarks for LLMs cover only a limited range of vulnerabilities. In contrast, TOSSS relies on the CVE database and provides an extensible framework that can integrate newly disclosed vulnerabilities over time. Our benchmark gives each model a security score between 0 and 1 based on its behavior; a score of 1 indicates that the model always selects the secure snippet, while a score of 0 indicates that it always selects the vulnerable one. We evaluate 14 widely used open-source and closed-source models on C/C++ and Java code and observe scores ranging from 0.48 to 0.89. LLM providers already publish many benchmark scores for their models, and TOSSS could become a complementary security-focused score to include in these reports.

How to Securely Shuffle? A survey about Secure Shufflers for privacy-preserving computations

Ishai et al. (FOCS'06) introduced secure shuffling as an efficient building block for private data aggregation. Recently, the field of differential privacy has revived interest in secure shufflers by highlighting the privacy amplification they can provide in various computations. Although several works argue for the utility of secure shufflers, they often treat them as black boxes; overlooking the practical vulnerabilities and performance trade-offs of existing implementations. This leaves a central question open: what makes a good secure shuffler? This survey addresses that question by identifying, categorizing, and comparing 26 secure protocols that realize the necessary shuffling functionality. To enable a meaningful comparison, we adapt and unify existing security definitions into a consistent set of properties. We also present an overview of privacy-preserving technologies that rely on secure shufflers, offer practical guidelines for selecting appropriate protocols, and outline promising directions for future work.

Fedivertex: a Graph Dataset based on Decentralized Social Networks for Trustworthy Machine Learning

Decentralized machine learning - where each client keeps its own data locally and uses its own computational resources to collaboratively train a model by exchanging peer-to-peer messages - is increasingly popular, as it enables better scalability and control over the data. A major challenge in this setting is that learning dynamics depend on the topology of the communication graph, which motivates the use of real graph datasets for benchmarking decentralized algorithms. Unfortunately, existing graph datasets are largely limited to for-profit social networks crawled at a fixed point in time and often collected at the user scale, where links are heavily influenced by the platform and its recommendation algorithms. The Fediverse, which includes several free and open-source decentralized social media platforms such as Mastodon, Misskey, and Lemmy, offers an interesting real-world alternative. We introduce Fedivertex, a new dataset of 182 graphs, covering seven social networks from the Fediverse, crawled weekly over 14 weeks. We release the dataset along with a Python package to facilitate its use, and illustrate its utility on several tasks, including a new defederation task, which captures a process of link deletion observed on these networks.

Evaluating Membership Inference Attacks in heterogeneous-data setups

Among all privacy attacks against Machine Learning (ML), membership inference attacks (MIA) attracted the most attention. In these attacks, the attacker is given an ML model and a data point, and they must infer whether the data point was used for training. The attacker also has an auxiliary dataset to tune their inference algorithm. Attack papers commonly simulate setups in which the attacker's and the target's datasets are sampled from the same distribution. This setting is convenient to perform experiments, but it rarely holds in practice. ML literature commonly starts with similar simplifying assumptions (i.e., "i.i.d." datasets), and later generalizes the results to support heterogeneous data distributions. Similarly, our work makes a first step in the generalization of the MIA evaluation to heterogeneous data. First, we design a metric to measure the heterogeneity between any pair of tabular data distributions. This metric provides a continuous scale to analyze the phenomenon. Second, we compare two methodologies to simulate a data heterogeneity between the target and the attacker. These setups provide opposite performances: 90% attack accuracy vs. 50% (i.e., random guessing). Our results show that the MIA accuracy depends on the experimental setup; and even if research on MIA considers heterogeneous data setups, we have no standardized baseline of how to simulate it. The lack of such a baseline for MIA experiments poses a significant challenge to risk assessments in real-world machine learning scenarios.