Abstract:Ensuring the reliability of machine learning-based intrusion detection systems remains a critical challenge in Internet of Things (IoT) environments, particularly as data poisoning attacks increasingly threaten the integrity of model training pipelines. This study evaluates the susceptibility of four widely used classifiers, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine, Logistic Regression, and Deep Neural Network models, against multiple poisoning strategies using three real-world IoT datasets. Results show that while ensemble-based models exhibit comparatively stable performance, Logistic Regression and Deep Neural Networks suffer degradation of up to 40% under label manipulation and outlier-based attacks. Such disruptions significantly distort decision boundaries, reduce detection fidelity, and undermine deployment readiness. The findings highlight the need for adversarially robust training, continuous anomaly monitoring, and feature-level validation within operational Network Intrusion Detection Systems. The study also emphasizes the importance of integrating resilience testing into regulatory and compliance frameworks for AI-driven IoT security. Overall, this work provides an empirical foundation for developing more resilient intrusion detection pipelines and informs future research on adaptive, attack-aware models capable of maintaining reliability under adversarial IoT conditions.
Abstract:We present a systematic measurement study of seven tactics for reducing cloud LLM token usage when a small local model can act as a triage layer in front of a frontier cloud model. The tactics are: (1) local routing, (2) prompt compression, (3) semantic caching, (4) local drafting with cloud review, (5) minimal-diff edits, (6) structured intent extraction, and (7) batching with vendor prompt caching. We implement all seven in an open-source shim that speaks both MCP and the OpenAI-compatible HTTP surface, supporting any local model via Ollama and any cloud model via an OpenAI-compatible endpoint. We evaluate each tactic individually, in pairs, and in a greedy-additive subset across four coding-agent workload classes (edit-heavy, explanation-heavy, general chat, RAG-heavy). We measure tokens saved, dollar cost, latency, and routing accuracy. Our headline finding is that T1 (local routing) combined with T2 (prompt compression) achieves 45-79% cloud token savings on edit-heavy and explanation-heavy workloads, while on RAG-heavy workloads the full tactic set including T4 (draft-review) achieves 51% savings. We observe that the optimal tactic subset is workload-dependent, which we believe is the most actionable finding for practitioners deploying coding agents today.
Abstract:LLM-powered coding agents increasingly rely on tool-use protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to read and write files on a developer's workstation. When a write fails - due to content filters, truncation, or an interrupted session - the agent typically receives no structured signal, loses the draft, and wastes tokens retrying blindly. We present Resilient Write, an MCP server that interposes a six-layer durable write surface between the agent and the filesystem. The layers - pre-flight risk scoring, transactional atomic writes, resume-safe chunking, structured typed errors, out-of-band scratchpad storage, and task-continuity handoff envelopes - are orthogonal and independently adoptable. Each layer maps to a concrete failure mode observed during a real agent session in April 2026, in which content-safety filters silently rejected a draft containing redacted API-key prefixes. Three additional tools - chunk preview, format-aware validation, and journal analytics - emerged from using the system to compose this paper. A 186-test suite validates correctness at each layer, and quantitative comparison against naive and defensive baselines shows a 5x reduction in recovery time and a 13x improvement in agent self-correction rate. Resilient Write is open-source under the MIT license.