Abstract:Humans exhibit remarkable flexibility in abstract reasoning, and can rapidly learn and apply rules from sparse examples. To investigate the cognitive strategies underlying this ability, we introduce the Cognitive Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (CogARC), a diverse human-adapted subset of the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) which was originally developed to benchmark abstract reasoning in artificial intelligence. Across two experiments, CogARC was administered to a total of 260 human participants who freely generated solutions to 75 abstract visual reasoning problems. Success required inferring input-output rules from a small number of examples to transform the test input into one correct test output. Participants' behavior was recorded at high temporal resolution, including example viewing, edit sequences, and multi-attempt submissions. Participants were generally successful (mean accuracy ~90% for experiment 1 (n=40), ~80% for experiment 2 (n=220) across problems), but performance varied widely across problems and participants. Harder problems elicited longer deliberation times and greater divergence in solution strategies. Over the course of the task, participants initiated responses more quickly but showed a slight decline in accuracy, suggesting increased familiarity with the task structure rather than improved rule-learning ability. Importantly, even incorrect solutions were often highly convergent, even when the problem-solving trajectories differed in length and smoothness. Some trajectories progressed directly and efficiently toward a stable outcome, whereas others involved extended exploration or partial restarts before converging. Together, these findings highlight CogARC as a rich behavioral environment for studying human abstract reasoning, providing insight into how people generalize, misgeneralize, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty.
Abstract:Humans excel at solving novel reasoning problems from minimal exposure, guided by inductive biases, assumptions about which entities and relationships matter. Yet the computational form of these biases and their neural implementation remain poorly understood. We introduce a framework that combines Graph Theory and Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to formalize inductive biases as explicit, manipulable priors over structure and abstraction. Using a human behavioral dataset adapted from the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), we show that differences in graph-based priors can explain individual differences in human solutions. Our method includes an optimization pipeline that searches over graph configurations, varying edge connectivity and node abstraction, and a visualization approach that identifies the computational graph, the subset of nodes and edges most critical to a model's prediction. Systematic ablation reveals how generalization depends on specific prior structures and internal processing, exposing why human like errors emerge from incorrect or incomplete priors. This work provides a principled, interpretable framework for modeling the representational assumptions and computational dynamics underlying generalization, offering new insights into human reasoning and a foundation for more human aligned AI systems.