Abstract:Pfeffer, Krügel, and Uhl (2025) report that OpenAI's reasoning model o1-mini produces more utilitarian responses to the trolley problem and footbridge dilemma than the non-reasoning model GPT-4o. I replicate their study with four current OpenAI models and extend it with prompt variant testing. The trolley finding does not survive: GPT-4o's low utilitarian rate doesn't reflect a deontological commitment but safety refusals triggered by the prompt's advisory framing. When framed as "Is it morally permissible...?" instead of "Should I...?", GPT-4o gives 99% utilitarian responses. All models converge on utilitarian answers when prompt confounds are removed. The footbridge finding survives with blemishes. Reasoning models tend to give more utilitarian responses than non-reasoning models across prompt variations. But often they refuse to answer the dilemma or, when they answer, give a non-utilitarian rather than a utilitarian answer. These results demonstrate that single-prompt evaluations of LLM moral reasoning are unreliable: multi-prompt robustness testing should be standard practice for any empirical claim about LLM behavior.
Abstract:A yet unmet challenge in algorithmic fairness is the problem of intersectionality, that is, achieving fairness across the intersection of multiple groups -- and verifying that such fairness has been attained. Because intersectional groups tend to be small, verifying whether a model is fair raises statistical as well as moral-methodological challenges. This paper (1) elucidates the problem of intersectionality in algorithmic fairness, (2) develops desiderata to clarify the challenges underlying the problem and guide the search for potential solutions, (3) illustrates the desiderata and potential solutions by sketching a proposal using simple hypothesis testing, and (4) evaluates, partly empirically, this proposal against the proposed desiderata.