Nash, Conley, and Computation: Impossibility and Incompleteness in Game Dynamics

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile is mapped to the next, this becomes a problem in the theory of dynamical systems. We apply this theory, and in particular the concepts of chain recurrence, attractors, and Conley index, to prove a general impossibility result: there exist games for which any dynamics is bound to have starting points that do not end up at a Nash equilibrium. We also prove a stronger result for $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria: there are games such that no game dynamics can converge (in an appropriate sense) to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria, and in fact the set of such games has positive measure. Further numerical results demonstrate that this holds for any $\epsilon$ between zero and $0.09$. Our results establish that, although the notions of Nash equilibria (and its computation-inspired approximations) are universally applicable in all games, they are also fundamentally incomplete as predictors of long term behavior, regardless of the choice of dynamics.

Differentially Private Regression with Unbounded Covariates

We provide computationally efficient, differentially private algorithms for the classical regression settings of Least Squares Fitting, Binary Regression and Linear Regression with unbounded covariates. Prior to our work, privacy constraints in such regression settings were studied under strong a priori bounds on covariates. We consider the case of Gaussian marginals and extend recent differentially private techniques on mean and covariance estimation (Kamath et al., 2019; Karwa and Vadhan, 2018) to the sub-gaussian regime. We provide a novel technical analysis yielding differentially private algorithms for the above classical regression settings. Through the case of Binary Regression, we capture the fundamental and widely-studied models of logistic regression and linearly-separable SVMs, learning an unbiased estimate of the true regression vector, up to a scaling factor.