Reproducing Random Forest Efficacy in Detecting Port Scanning

Port scanning is the process of attempting to connect to various network ports on a computing endpoint to determine which ports are open and which services are running on them. It is a common method used by hackers to identify vulnerabilities in a network or system. By determining which ports are open, an attacker can identify which services and applications are running on a device and potentially exploit any known vulnerabilities in those services. Consequently, it is important to detect port scanning because it is often the first step in a cyber attack. By identifying port scanning attempts, cybersecurity professionals can take proactive measures to protect the systems and networks before an attacker has a chance to exploit any vulnerabilities. Against this background, researchers have worked for over a decade to develop robust methods to detect port scanning. One such method revealed by a recent systematic review is the random forest supervised machine learning algorithm. The review revealed six existing studies using random forest since 2021. Unfortunately, those studies each exhibit different results, do not all use the same training and testing dataset, and only two include source code. Accordingly, the goal of this work was to reproduce the six random forest studies while addressing the apparent shortcomings. The outcomes are significant for researchers looking to explore random forest to detect port scanning and for practitioners interested in reliable technology to detect the early stages of cyber attack.

Detecting Synthetic Phenomenology in a Contained Artificial General Intelligence

Human-like intelligence in a machine is a contentious subject. Whether mankind should or should not pursue the creation of artificial general intelligence is hotly debated. As well, researchers have aligned in opposing factions according to whether mankind can create it. For our purposes, we assume mankind can and will do so. Thus, it becomes necessary to contemplate how to do so in a safe and trusted manner -- enter the idea of boxing or containment. As part of such thinking, we wonder how a phenomenology might be detected given the operational constraints imposed by any potential containment system. Accordingly, this work provides an analysis of existing measures of phenomenology through qualia and extends those ideas into the context of a contained artificial general intelligence.

Stovepiping and Malicious Software: A Critical Review of AGI Containment

Awareness of the possible impacts associated with artificial intelligence has risen in proportion to progress in the field. While there are tremendous benefits to society, many argue that there are just as many, if not more, concerns related to advanced forms of artificial intelligence. Accordingly, research into methods to develop artificial intelligence safely is increasingly important. In this paper, we provide an overview of one such safety paradigm: containment with a critical lens aimed toward generative adversarial networks and potentially malicious artificial intelligence. Additionally, we illuminate the potential for a developmental blindspot in the stovepiping of containment mechanisms.

A Cyber Science Based Ontology for Artificial General Intelligence Containment

The development of artificial general intelligence is considered by many to be inevitable. What such intelligence does after becoming aware is not so certain. To that end, research suggests that the likelihood of artificial general intelligence becoming hostile to humans is significant enough to warrant inquiry into methods to limit such potential. Thus, containment of artificial general intelligence is a timely and meaningful research topic. While there is limited research exploring possible containment strategies, such work is bounded by the underlying field the strategies draw upon. Accordingly, we set out to construct an ontology to describe necessary elements in any future containment technology. Using existing academic literature, we developed a single domain ontology containing five levels, 32 codes, and 32 associated descriptors. Further, we constructed ontology diagrams to demonstrate intended relationships. We then identified humans, AGI, and the cyber world as novel agent objects necessary for future containment activities. Collectively, the work addresses three critical gaps: (a) identifying and arranging fundamental constructs; (b) situating AGI containment within cyber science; and (c) developing scientific rigor within the field.