Abstract:Are large language models (LLMs) sensitive to the distinction between humanly possible languages and humanly impossible languages? This question is taken by many to bear on whether LLMs and humans share the same innate learning biases. Previous work has attempted to answer it in the positive by comparing LLM learning curves on existing language datasets and on "impossible" datasets derived from them via various perturbation functions. Using the same methodology, we examine this claim on a wider set of languages and impossible perturbations. We find that in most cases, GPT-2 learns each language and its impossible counterpart equally easily, in contrast to previous claims. We also apply a more lenient condition by testing whether GPT-2 provides any kind of separation between the whole set of natural languages and the whole set of impossible languages. By considering cross-linguistic variance in various metrics computed on the perplexity curves, we show that GPT-2 provides no systematic separation between the possible and the impossible. Taken together, these perspectives show that LLMs do not share the human innate biases that shape linguistic typology.
Abstract:We consider the possible role of current large language models (LLMs) in the study of human linguistic cognition. We focus on the use of such models as proxies for theories of cognition that are relatively linguistically-neutral in their representations and learning but differ from current LLMs in key ways. We illustrate this potential use of LLMs as proxies for theories of cognition in the context of two kinds of questions: (a) whether the target theory accounts for the acquisition of a given pattern from a given corpus; and (b) whether the target theory makes a given typologically-attested pattern easier to acquire than another, typologically-unattested pattern. For each of the two questions we show, building on recent literature, how current LLMs can potentially be of help, but we note that at present this help is quite limited.