"Cause" is Mechanistic Narrative within Scientific Domains: An Ordinary Language Philosophical Critique of "Causal Machine Learning"

Causal Learning has emerged as a major theme of AI in recent years, promising to use special techniques to reveal the true nature of cause and effect in a number of important domains. We consider the Epistemology of learning and recognizing true cause and effect phenomena. Through thought exercises on the customary use of the word ''cause'', especially in scientific domains, we investigate what, in practice, constitutes a valid causal claim. We recognize the word's uses across scientific domains in disparate form but consistent function within the scientific paradigm. We highlight fundamental distinctions of practice that can be performed in the natural and social sciences, highlight the importance of many systems of interest being open and irreducible and identify the important notion of Hermeneutic knowledge for social science inquiry. We posit that the distinct properties require that definitive causal claims can only come through an agglomeration of consistent evidence across multiple domains and levels of abstraction, such as empirical, physiological, biochemical, etc. We present Cognitive Science as an exemplary multi-disciplinary field providing omnipresent opportunity for such a Research Program, and highlight the main general modes of practice of scientific inquiry that can adequately merge, rather than place as incorrigibly conflictual, multi-domain multi-abstraction scientific practices and language games.