Abstract:The reliability of AI generative models is typically measured by output correctness, yet in practice it depends on the effort required to verify those outputs. We argue that current evaluation metrics overlook a critical failure mode: Verification-Cost Errors (VCEs), defined as incorrect input-output pairs that a declared fraction of the verifier population fails to identify within the verification budget available in a given deployment context. Unlike standard notions of "hallucination", VCEs are defined operationally, by the failure of correct identification within budget rather than by any property of the output itself. Plausibility and authoritative presentation are hypothesised contributors to that failure, not defining conditions. To capture this asymmetry, we introduce the notion of verification cost relative to a deployment budget as an operational dimension that current evaluation does not routinely capture. The quantity is presented as a conceptual instrument rather than a finalized metric. Evidence from code generation and multi-modal document understanding shows that high benchmark accuracy can mask significant verification effort in practice. We therefore take the position that correctness alone is insufficient as a measure of reliability. AI evaluation should explicitly account for verification cost, reflecting whether errors can be detected under realistic resource constraints.
Abstract:Floridi's conjecture offers a compelling intuition about the fundamental trade-off between certainty and scope in artificial intelligence (AI) systems. This exploration remains crucial, not merely as a philosophical exercise, but as a potential compass for guiding AI investments, particularly in safety-critical industrial domains where the level of attention will surely be higher in the future. However, while intellectually coherent, its formalization ultimately freezes this insight into a suspended epistemic truth, resisting operationalization within real-world systems. This paper is a result of an analysis arguing that the conjecture's ambition to provide insights to engineering design and regulatory decision-making is constrained by two critical factors: first, its reliance on incomputable constructs - rendering it practically unactionable and unverifiable; second, its underlying ontological assumption of AI systems as self-contained epistemic entities - separating it from the intricate and dynamic socio-technical environments in which knowledge is co-constructed. We conclude that this dual breakdown - an epistemic closure deficit and an embeddedness bypass - prevents the conjecture from transitioning into a computable and actionable framework suitable for informing the design, deployment, and governance of real-world AI hybrid systems. In response, we propose a contribution to the framing of Floridi's epistemic challenge, addressing the inherent epistemic burdens of AI within complex human-centric domains.