Multimodal Attack Detection for Action Recognition Models

Adversarial machine learning attacks on video action recognition models is a growing research area and many effective attacks were introduced in recent years. These attacks show that action recognition models can be breached in many ways. Hence using these models in practice raises significant security concerns. However, there are very few works which focus on defending against or detecting attacks. In this work, we propose a novel universal detection method which is compatible with any action recognition model. In our extensive experiments, we show that our method consistently detects various attacks against different target models with high true positive rates while satisfying very low false positive rates. Tested against four state-of-the-art attacks targeting four action recognition models, the proposed detector achieves an average AUC of 0.911 over 16 test cases while the best performance achieved by the existing detectors is 0.645 average AUC. This 41.2% improvement is enabled by the robustness of the proposed detector to varying attack methods and target models. The lowest AUC achieved by our detector across the 16 test cases is 0.837 while the competing detector's performance drops as low as 0.211. We also show that the proposed detector is robust to varying attack strengths. In addition, we analyze our method's real-time performance with different hardware setups to demonstrate its potential as a practical defense mechanism.

Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks Against Video Anomaly Detection Systems

Anomaly detection in videos is an important computer vision problem with various applications including automated video surveillance. Although adversarial attacks on image understanding models have been heavily investigated, there is not much work on adversarial machine learning targeting video understanding models and no previous work which focuses on video anomaly detection. To this end, we investigate an adversarial machine learning attack against video anomaly detection systems, that can be implemented via an easy-to-perform cyber-attack. Since surveillance cameras are usually connected to the server running the anomaly detection model through a wireless network, they are prone to cyber-attacks targeting the wireless connection. We demonstrate how Wi-Fi deauthentication attack, a notoriously easy-to-perform and effective denial-of-service (DoS) attack, can be utilized to generate adversarial data for video anomaly detection systems. Specifically, we apply several effects caused by the Wi-Fi deauthentication attack on video quality (e.g., slow down, freeze, fast forward, low resolution) to the popular benchmark datasets for video anomaly detection. Our experiments with several state-of-the-art anomaly detection models show that the attackers can significantly undermine the reliability of video anomaly detection systems by causing frequent false alarms and hiding physical anomalies from the surveillance system.