Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare

When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.

Evaluating Genetic Algorithms through the Approximability Hierarchy

Optimization problems frequently appear in any scientific domain. Most of the times, the corresponding decision problem turns out to be NP-hard, and in these cases genetic algorithms are often used to obtain approximated solutions. However, the difficulty to approximate different NP-hard problems can vary a lot. In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of using genetic algorithms depending on the approximation class the problem belongs to. In particular, we use the standard approximability hierarchy, showing that genetic algorithms are especially useful for the most pessimistic classes of the hierarchy