Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate high-quality arguments, yet their ability to engage in nuanced and persuasive communicative actions remains largely unexplored. This work explores the persuasive potential of LLMs through the framework of Jürgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. It examines whether LLMs express illocutionary intent (i.e., pragmatic functions of language such as conveying knowledge, building trust, or signaling similarity) in ways that are comparable to human communication. We simulate online discussions between opinion holders and LLMs using conversations from the persuasive subreddit ChangeMyView. We then compare the likelihood of illocutionary intents in human-written and LLM-generated counter-arguments, specifically those that successfully changed the original poster's view. We find that all three LLMs effectively convey illocutionary intent -- often more so than humans -- potentially increasing their anthropomorphism. Further, LLMs craft sycophantic responses that closely align with the opinion holder's intent, a strategy strongly associated with opinion change. Finally, crowd-sourced workers find LLM-generated counter-arguments more agreeable and consistently prefer them over human-written ones. These findings suggest that LLMs' persuasive power extends beyond merely generating high-quality arguments. On the contrary, training LLMs with human preferences effectively tunes them to mirror human communication patterns, particularly nuanced communicative actions, potentially increasing individuals' susceptibility to their influence.
Abstract:Interpretable linguistic features offer a promising approach for explaining why a given text appears machine-generated, particularly for non-expert users. However, existing findings on which features reliably indicate LLM-generated text remain fragmented across feature sets, models, and text domains. To address this gap, we conduct a large-scale empirical study assessing the robustness of linguistic signals for characterizing AI-generated text. Our analysis covers 284 interpretable linguistic features across outputs from 27 LLMs and ten text domains under cross-model and cross-domain generalization settings. We show that classifiers based solely on linguistic features can reliably distinguish AI-generated from human-written text. However, many previously proposed indicators prove strongly context-dependent, with the exception of measures of lexical richness, which remain robust signals across model families and text domains. These results demonstrate which linguistic signals generalize across contexts and provide a foundation for more reliable, interpretable analyses of AI-generated language.
Abstract:Reward models are a key component of large language model alignment, serving as proxies for human preferences during training. However, existing evaluations focus primarily on broad instruction-following benchmarks, providing limited insight into whether these models capture socially desirable preferences. As a result, important failures in social alignment can remain hidden. We extend reward-model benchmarking to four socially consequential domains: bias, safety, morality, and ethical reasoning. We introduce a framework that converts social evaluation datasets into pairwise preference data, leveraging gold labels where available and directional bias indicators otherwise. This enables us to test whether reward models prefer socially undesirable responses, and whether their preferences produce systematically biased distributions over selected outputs. Across five publicly available reward models and two instruction-tuned models used as reward proxies, we find substantial variation across domains, with no single model performing best overall. The models fall well short of strong social intelligence: they often prefer socially undesirable options, and their preferences produce systematically biased distributions. Moreover, stronger bias avoidance can reduce sensitivity to context, revealing a key alignment trade-off between avoiding biased outcomes and preserving contextual faithfulness. These findings show that standard reward benchmarks are insufficient for assessing social alignment and highlight the need for evaluations that directly measure the social preferences encoded in reward models.