Geometric Metrics for MoE Specialization: From Fisher Information to Early Failure Detection

Expert specialization is fundamental to Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model success, yet existing metrics (cosine similarity, routing entropy) lack theoretical grounding and yield inconsistent conclusions under reparameterization. We present an information-geometric framework providing the first rigorous characterization of MoE specialization dynamics. Our key insight is that expert routing distributions evolve on the probability simplex equipped with the Fisher information metric, enabling formal analysis via Riemannian geometry. We prove that standard heuristic metrics violate parameterization invariance (Theorem 1), establish that specialization corresponds to geodesic flow with quantified approximation bounds (Theorem 2), and derive a failure predictor with theoretical threshold justification (Theorem 3). The framework introduces two principled metrics: Fisher Specialization Index (FSI) achieving r=0.91+/-0.02 correlation with downstream performance, and Fisher Heterogeneity Score (FHS) predicting training failure at 10% completion with AUC=0.89+/-0.03 -- outperforming validation-loss-based early stopping by 23% while requiring 40x fewer compute cycles. We validate intervention protocols achieving 87% recovery rate when FHS>1 is detected. Comprehensive experiments across language modeling (WikiText-103, C4), vision MoE (ImageNet), and scaling studies (8-64 experts, 125M-2.7B parameters) validate our theoretical predictions.

Coalition Formation in LLM Agent Networks: Stability Analysis and Convergence Guarantees

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems requiring strategic coordination. While recent work has analyzed LLM behavior in two-player games, coalition formation, where $n$ agents dynamically form cooperative groups, remains theoretically uncharacterized. We present the first framework grounding coalition formation in LLM agent networks in hedonic game theory with formal stability guarantees. We introduce the LLM Coalition Formation Game (LCFG), establish sufficient conditions for Nash-stable partitions, and prove complexity results. Our analysis reveals that LLM agents exhibit bounded rationality characterized by $ε$-rational preferences; we provide both deterministic existence guarantees and consistency-driven stability bounds whose predictions are consistent with empirical outcomes. Experiments with GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3 across 2,400 episodes validate our framework: LLM coalitions achieve Nash stability in 73.2% of cases under our Coalition-of-Thought (CoalT) protocol, compared to 58.4% under chain-of-thought and 41.8% under standard prompting ($p < 0.001$). Our framework provides theoretical foundations for designing stable multi-agent LLM systems.