Placement Semantics for Distributed Deep Learning: A Systematic Framework for Analyzing Parallelism Strategies

Training large language models requires distributing computation across many accelerators, yet practitioners select parallelism strategies (data, tensor, pipeline, ZeRO) through trial and error because no unified systematic framework predicts their behavior. We introduce placement semantics: each strategy is specified by how it places four training states (parameters, optimizer, gradients, activations) across devices using five modes (replicated, sharded, sharded-with-gather, materialized, offloaded). From placement alone, without implementation details, we derive memory consumption and communication volume. Our predictions match published results exactly: ZeRO-3 uses 8x less memory than data parallelism at 1.5x communication cost, as reported in the original paper. We prove two conditions (gradient integrity, state consistency) are necessary and sufficient for distributed training to match single-device results, and provide composition rules for combining strategies safely. The framework unifies ZeRO Stages 1-3, Fully Sharded Data Parallel (FSDP), tensor parallelism, and pipeline parallelism as instances with different placement choices.

Can We Trust AI Explanations? Evidence of Systematic Underreporting in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning

When AI systems explain their reasoning step-by-step, practitioners often assume these explanations reveal what actually influenced the AI's answer. We tested this assumption by embedding hints into questions and measuring whether models mentioned them. In a study of over 9,000 test cases across 11 leading AI models, we found a troubling pattern: models almost never mention hints spontaneously, yet when asked directly, they admit noticing them. This suggests models see influential information but choose not to report it. Telling models they are being watched does not help. Forcing models to report hints works, but causes them to report hints even when none exist and reduces their accuracy. We also found that hints appealing to user preferences are especially dangerous-models follow them most often while reporting them least. These findings suggest that simply watching AI reasoning is not enough to catch hidden influences.