Autonomy and Agency in Agentic AI: Architectural Tactics for Regulated Contexts

Deploying agentic AI in regulated contexts requires principled reasoning about two design dimensions: agency (what the system can do) and autonomy (how much it acts without human involvement). Though often treated independently, they are coupled: at higher autonomy, human error correction is less available, so reliable operation requires constraining agency accordingly; compliance requirements reinforce this by mandating human involvement as action consequences grow. Yet no established approach addresses them jointly, leaving practitioners without a principled basis for reasoning about oversight, action consequences, and error correction. This work introduces a two-dimensional design space in which both dimensions are organised into five operational levels, making the coupling explicit and navigable. Autonomy ranges from human-commanded operation (L1) to fully autonomous monitoring (L5); agency ranges from reasoning over supplied context (L1) to committed writes to authoritative records (L5). Building on this space, we propose six architectural tactics--checkpoints, escalation, multi-agent delegation, tool provisioning, tool fencing, and write staging--for adjusting a deployment's position within it. The tactics are grounded in two worked examples from public-sector contexts, illustrating how they apply under realistic compliance constraints. We further examine five deployment parameters--model capability, agent architecture, tool fidelity, workflow bottlenecks, and evaluation--that shape what is achievable at any configuration independently of agency and autonomy. Together, the design space, tactics, and deployment parameters provide a shared vocabulary for principled, compliance-aware agentic AI design in which responsibility, auditability, and reversibility are explicit design considerations rather than properties that must be retrofitted after deployment.

Can Search-Based Testing with Pareto Optimization Effectively Cover Failure-Revealing Test Inputs?

Search-based software testing (SBST) is a widely adopted technique for testing complex systems with large input spaces, such as Deep Learning-enabled (DL-enabled) systems. Many SBST techniques focus on Pareto-based optimization, where multiple objectives are optimized in parallel to reveal failures. However, it is important to ensure that identified failures are spread throughout the entire failure-inducing area of a search domain and not clustered in a sub-region. This ensures that identified failures are semantically diverse and reveal a wide range of underlying causes. In this paper, we present a theoretical argument explaining why testing based on Pareto optimization is inadequate for covering failure-inducing areas within a search domain. We support our argument with empirical results obtained by applying two widely used types of Pareto-based optimization techniques, namely NSGA-II (an evolutionary algorithm) and MOPSO (a swarm-based algorithm), to two DL-enabled systems: an industrial Automated Valet Parking (AVP) system and a system for classifying handwritten digits. We measure the coverage of failure-revealing test inputs in the input space using a metric that we refer to as the Coverage Inverted Distance quality indicator. Our results show that NSGA-II and MOPSO are not more effective than a na\"ive random search baseline in covering test inputs that reveal failures. The replication package for this study is available in a GitHub repository.