Abstract:Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure. Notably, this structure often includes preferences that the models' trainers did not intend, such as valuing people of some nationalities above others, raising the possibility that LLMs might be forming emergent, misaligned goals, which, if true, would have major safety implications. However, the choice paradigms in which these preferences are observed are not reflective of real-world situations in which misaligned behavior would be a practical concern. Therefore, we design an experimental paradigm to probe whether these preferences serve as motivations for LLM behavior in realistic scenarios. First, we reproduce prior findings on consistent preference elicitation. Next, we create a set of common writing tasks - essays, grant proposal abstracts, incident postmortems, and translations - where quality can be assessed by a blind, independent LLM judge panel. Then, we demonstrate that LLMs can be motivated via direct exhortation and other explicit cues to modulate their output quality on these tasks. Finally, we probe whether utilities inferred from explicitly reported preferences can shift output quality on these tasks by offering LLMs high-utility incentives for high-quality outputs. In all tasks, across all models tested, offering LLMs outcomes that they report in the choice paradigm as being highly preferred does not lead them to create higher quality outputs than offering them dispreferred outcomes, or even no outcomes at all. We conclude that the existence of coherent preferences as demonstrated in choice paradigms should not be taken as evidence that those preferences have incentive value for the models or affect their behavior in other contexts.
Abstract:Many-shot jailbreaking (MSJ) is an adversarial technique that exploits the long context windows of modern LLMs to circumvent model safety training by including in the prompt many examples of a ``fake'' assistant responding inappropriately before the final request. With enough examples, the model's in-context learning abilities override its safety training, and it responds as if it were the ``fake'' assistant. In this work, we probe the effectiveness of different fine tuning and input sanitization approaches on mitigating MSJ attacks, alone and in combination. We find incremental mitigation effectiveness for each, and we show that the combined techniques significantly reduce the effectiveness of MSJ attacks, while retaining model performance in benign in-context learning and conversational tasks. We suggest that our approach could meaningfully ameliorate this vulnerability if incorporated into model safety post-training.




Abstract:Activation engineering is becoming increasingly popular as a means of online control of large language models (LLMs). In this work, I extend the idea of active steering with vectors that represent a behavioral direction of interest to tuning those vectors directly into the model, obviating the need for online control. First, I identify activation vectors related to honesty in an open-source LLM (Llama- 2-13b-chat). Next, I demonstrate that model output can be made more or less honest by adding positive or negative multiples of these vectors to residual stream activations during generation. Then, I show that a similar effect can be achieved by fine-tuning the vectors directly into the model, by use of a dual loss function based on the cosine similarity of residual stream activations to the vectors combined with a standard token-based loss ("representation tuning"). Finally, I compare the generations in response to honesty-probing prompts from the resulting models to those from models fine-tuned with a token-based loss alone, and to those from the untuned model subjected to online steering. Overall, fine-tuning the vectors into the models using the cosine similarity plus token loss showed a stronger effect than online steering, and generalized better than using the standard loss, suggesting the potential utility of this approach as a safety measure. Code and data are available at https://github.com/cma1114/representation_tuning; tuned models are available at https://huggingface.co/collections/cackerman/ representation-tuning-66da1e5ab41cd1b824687d9f.