Measuring Reward-Seeking via Contrastive Belief Updates

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.