Defenders are overwhelmed by the number and scale of attacks against their networks.This problem will only be exacerbated as attackers leverage artificial intelligence to automate their workflows. We propose a path to autonomous cyber agents able to augment defenders by automating critical steps in the cyber defense life cycle.
Gate-defined quantum dots are a promising candidate system to realize scalable, coupled qubit systems and serve as a fundamental building block for quantum computers. However, present-day quantum dot devices suffer from imperfections that must be accounted for, which hinders the characterization, tuning, and operation process. Moreover, with an increasing number of quantum dot qubits, the relevant parameter space grows sufficiently to make heuristic control infeasible. Thus, it is imperative that reliable and scalable autonomous tuning approaches are developed. In this report, we outline current challenges in automating quantum dot device tuning and operation with a particular focus on datasets, benchmarking, and standardization. We also present ideas put forward by the quantum dot community on how to overcome them.
Gate-defined semiconductor quantum dot (QD) arrays are a promising platform for quantum computing. However, presently, the large configuration spaces and inherent noise make tuning of QD devices a nontrivial task and with the increasing number of QD qubits, the human-driven experimental control becomes unfeasible. Recently, researchers working with QD systems have begun putting considerable effort into automating device control, with a particular focus on machine-learning-driven methods. Yet, the reported performance statistics vary substantially in both the meaning and the type of devices used for testing. While systematic benchmarking of the proposed tuning methods is necessary for developing reliable and scalable tuning approaches, the lack of openly available standardized datasets of experimental data makes such testing impossible. The QD auto-annotator -- a classical algorithm for automatic interpretation and labeling of experimentally acquired data -- is a critical step toward rectifying this. QD auto-annotator leverages the principles of geometry to produce state labels for experimental double-QD charge stability diagrams and is a first step towards building a large public repository of labeled QD data.
Standardized file formats play a key role in the development and use of computer software. However, it is possible to abuse standardized file formats by creating a file that is valid in multiple file formats. The resulting polyglot (many languages) file can confound file format identification, allowing elements of the file to evade analysis.This is especially problematic for malware detection systems that rely on file format identification for feature extraction. File format identification processes that depend on file signatures can be easily evaded thanks to flexibility in the format specifications of certain file formats. Although work has been done to identify file formats using more comprehensive methods than file signatures, accurate identification of polyglot files remains an open problem. Since malware detection systems routinely perform file format-specific feature extraction, polyglot files need to be filtered out prior to ingestion by these systems. Otherwise, malicious content could pass through undetected. To address the problem of polyglot detection we assembled a data set using the mitra tool. We then evaluated the performance of the most commonly used file identification tool, file. Finally, we demonstrated the accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score of a range of machine and deep learning models. Malconv2 and Catboost demonstrated the highest recall on our data set with 95.16% and 95.45%, respectively. These models can be incorporated into a malware detector's file processing pipeline to filter out potentially malicious polyglots before file format-dependent feature extraction takes place.
There is a lack of scientific testing of commercially available malware detectors, especially those that boast accurate classification of never-before-seen (zero-day) files using machine learning (ML). The result is that the efficacy and trade-offs among the different available approaches are opaque. In this paper, we address this gap in the scientific literature with an evaluation of commercially available malware detection tools. We tested each tool against 3,536 total files (2,554 72% malicious, 982 28% benign) including over 400 zero-day malware, and tested with a variety of file types and protocols for delivery. Specifically, we investigate three questions: Do ML-based malware detectors provide better detection than signature-based detectors? Is it worth purchasing a network-level malware detector to complement host-based detection? What is the trade-off in detection time and detection accuracy among commercially available tools using static and dynamic analysis? We present statistical results on detection time and accuracy, consider complementary analysis (using multiple tools together), and provide a novel application of a recent cost-benefit evaluation procedure by Iannaconne \& Bridges that incorporates all the above metrics into a single quantifiable cost to help security operation centers select the right tools for their use case. Our results show that while ML-based tools are more effective at detecting zero-days and malicious executables, they work best when used in combination with a signature-based solution. In addition, network-based tools had poor detection rates on protocols other than the HTTP or SMTP, making them a poor choice if used on their own. Surprisingly, we also found that all the tools tested had lower than expected detection rates, completely missing 37% of malicious files tested and failing to detect any polyglot files.