Abstract:Across many domains (e.g., IoT, observability, telecommunications, cybersecurity), there is an emerging adoption of conversational data analysis agents that enable users to "talk to your data" to extract insights. Such data analysis agents operate on timeseries data models; e.g., measurements from sensors or events monitoring user clicks and actions in product analytics. We evaluate 6 popular data analysis agents (both open-source and proprietary) on domain-specific data and query types, and find that they fail on stateful and incident-specific queries. We observe two key expressivity gaps in existing evals: domain-customized datasets and domain-specific query types. To enable practitioners in such domains to generate customized and expressive evals for such timeseries data agents, we present AgentFuel. AgentFuel helps domain experts quickly create customized evals to perform end-to-end functional tests. We show that AgentFuel's benchmarks expose key directions for improvement in existing data agent frameworks. We also present anecdotal evidence that using AgentFuel can improve agent performance (e.g., with GEPA). AgentFuel benchmarks are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/RockfishData/TimeSeriesAgentEvals.




Abstract:How much does a given trained model leak about each individual data record in its training set? Membership inference attacks are used as an auditing tool to quantify the private information that a model leaks about the individual data points in its training set. Membership inference attacks are influenced by different uncertainties that an attacker has to resolve about training data, the training algorithm, and the underlying data distribution. Thus attack success rates, of many attacks in the literature, do not precisely capture the information leakage of models about their data, as they also reflect other uncertainties that the attack algorithm has. In this paper, we explain the implicit assumptions and also the simplifications made in prior work using the framework of hypothesis testing. We also derive new attack algorithms from the framework that can achieve a high AUC score while also highlighting the different factors that affect their performance. Our algorithms capture a very precise approximation of privacy loss in models, and can be used as a tool to perform an accurate and informed estimation of privacy risk in machine learning models. We provide a thorough empirical evaluation of our attack strategies on various machine learning tasks and benchmark datasets.