`Plausibilities of plausibilities': an approach through circumstances

Probability-like parameters appearing in some statistical models, and their prior distributions, are reinterpreted through the notion of `circumstance', a term which stands for any piece of knowledge that is useful in assigning a probability and that satisfies some additional logical properties. The idea, which can be traced to Laplace and Jaynes, is that the usual inferential reasonings about the probability-like parameters of a statistical model can be conceived as reasonings about equivalence classes of `circumstances' - viz., real or hypothetical pieces of knowledge, like e.g. physical hypotheses, that are useful in assigning a probability and satisfy some additional logical properties - that are uniquely indexed by the probability distributions they lead to.

The Laplace-Jaynes approach to induction

An approach to induction is presented, based on the idea of analysing the context of a given problem into `circumstances'. This approach, fully Bayesian in form and meaning, provides a complement or in some cases an alternative to that based on de Finetti's representation theorem and on the notion of infinite exchangeability. In particular, it gives an alternative interpretation of those formulae that apparently involve `unknown probabilities' or `propensities'. Various advantages and applications of the presented approach are discussed, especially in comparison to that based on exchangeability. Generalisations are also discussed.