Who's Driving? Game Theoretic Path Risk of AGI Development

Who controls the development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) might matter less than how we handle the fight for control itself. We formalize this "steering wheel problem" as humanity's greatest near-term existential risk may stem not from misaligned AGI, but from the dynamics of competing to develop it. Just as a car crash can occur from passengers fighting over the wheel before reaching any destination, catastrophic outcomes could arise from development competition long before AGI exists. While technical alignment research focuses on ensuring safe arrival, we show how coordination failures during development could drive us off the cliff first. We present a game theoretic framework modeling AGI development dynamics and prove conditions for sustainable cooperative equilibria. Drawing from nuclear control while accounting for AGI's unique characteristics, we propose concrete mechanisms including pre-registration, shared technical infrastructure, and automated deterrence to stabilize cooperation. Our key insight is that AGI creates network effects in safety: shared investments become more valuable as participation grows, enabling mechanism designs where cooperation dominates defection. This work bridges formal methodology and policy frameworks, providing foundations for practical governance of AGI competition risks.