Humans Disengage, Reasoning Models Persist: Separating Difficulty Registration from Deliberation Allocation

Large reasoning models (LRMs) take longer on harder problems, just as humans do. This surface similarity hides an opposite pattern within items. When an LRM gets a problem wrong, it spends more tokens than when it gets the same problem right; humans do the reverse, spending less time on the trials they get wrong. We separate two levels of deliberation: how response time tracks difficulty across items (registration), and, with item identity held fixed, whether an agent spends more on its own failures or successes (allocation). On a public matched human-LRM corpus, humans and all five thinking LRMs reproduce the known cross-item alignment (registration) but diverge within items (allocation): every LRM shows a large wrong-vs-right effect (Cohen's d = 1.47-3.13 on H-ARC) while humans show the opposite sign. The comparison stays inside each agent's own scale; we never put seconds and tokens on one axis. The dissociation holds under item fixed effects, replicates across datasets, and is absent in a non-thinking baseline. We read the human pattern as engagement versus abandonment: people stay on items they expect to solve and give up on the rest. We read the LRM pattern as length driven by uncertainty: chains grow when the model is unsure, which is exactly when it tends to fail. Both policies produce the same cross-item correlation with difficulty, so they look aligned on the measure prior work has used; the divergence shows up only once item identity is fixed. Under resource-rational metareasoning, the split is between two stopping policies that share a difficulty signal but implement opposite control; trace length captures the signal and misses the control.