Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier

We consider the following well studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with $n$ voters and $m$ candidates who lie in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a candidate whose average distance to the voters is small. However, instead of having direct access to the distances in the metric space, each voter gives us a ranked list of the candidates in order of distance. Can we design a rule that regardless of the election instance and underlying metric space, chooses a candidate whose cost differs from the true optimum by only a small factor (known as the distortion)? A long line of work culminated in finding deterministic voting rules with metric distortion $3$, which is the best possible for deterministic rules and many other classes of voting rules. However, without any restrictions, there is still a significant gap in our understanding: Even though the best lower bound is substantially lower at $2.112$, the best upper bound is still $3$, which is attained even by simple rules such as Random Dictatorship. Finding a rule that guarantees distortion $3 - \varepsilon$ for some constant $\varepsilon $ has been a major challenge in computational social choice. In this work, we give a rule that guarantees distortion less than $2.753$. To do so we study a handful of voting rules that are new to the problem. One is Maximal Lotteries, a rule based on the Nash equilibrium of a natural zero-sum game which dates back to the 60's. The others are novel rules that can be thought of as hybrids of Random Dictatorship and the Copeland rule. Though none of these rules can beat distortion $3$ alone, a careful randomization between Maximal Lotteries and any of the novel rules can.