Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with one manipulator, whilst with weighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with a small number of candidates and a coalition of manipulators. As only a couple of other voting rules are known to be NP-hard to manipulate with a single manipulator, Nanson's and Baldwin's rules appear to be particularly resistant to manipulation from a theoretical perspective. We also propose a number of approximation methods for manipulating these two rules. Experiments demonstrate that both rules are often difficult to manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style voting rules deserve further study.
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of this NP-hardness, we treat computing a manipulation as an approximation problem where we try to minimize the number of manipulators. Based on ideas from bin packing and multiprocessor scheduling, we propose two new approximation methods to compute manipulations of the Borda rule. Experiments show that these methods significantly outperform the previous best known %existing approximation method. We are able to find optimal manipulations in almost all the randomly generated elections tested. Our results suggest that, whilst computing a manipulation of the Borda rule by a coalition is NP-hard, computational complexity may provide only a weak barrier against manipulation in practice.
We solve constraint satisfaction problems through translation to answer set programming (ASP). Our reformulations have the property that unit-propagation in the ASP solver achieves well defined local consistency properties like arc, bound and range consistency. Experiments demonstrate the computational value of this approach.
We propose AllDiffPrecedence, a new global constraint that combines together an AllDifferent constraint with precedence constraints that strictly order given pairs of variables. We identify a number of applications for this global constraint including instruction scheduling and symmetry breaking. We give an efficient propagation algorithm that enforces bounds consistency on this global constraint. We show how to implement this propagator using a decomposition that extends the bounds consistency enforcing decomposition proposed for the AllDifferent constraint. Finally, we prove that enforcing domain consistency on this global constraint is NP-hard in general.
Symmetry is a common feature of many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately eliminating all symmetry from a problem is often computationally intractable. This paper argues that recent parameterized complexity results provide insight into that intractability and help identify special cases in which symmetry can be dealt with more tractably
Max Restricted Path Consistency (maxRPC) is a local consistency for binary constraints that can achieve considerably stronger pruning than arc consistency. However, existing maxRRC algorithms suffer from overheads and redundancies as they can repeatedly perform many constraint checks without triggering any value deletions. In this paper we propose techniques that can boost the performance of maxRPC algorithms. These include the combined use of two data structures to avoid many redundant constraint checks, and heuristics for the efficient ordering and execution of certain operations. Based on these, we propose two closely related algorithms. The first one which is a maxRPC algorithm with optimal O(end^3) time complexity, displays good performance when used stand-alone, but is expensive to apply during search. The second one approximates maxRPC and has O(en^2d^4) time complexity, but a restricted version with O(end^4) complexity can be very efficient when used during search. Both algorithms have O(ed) space complexity. Experimental results demonstrate that the resulting methods constantly outperform previous algorithms for maxRPC, often by large margins, and constitute a more than viable alternative to arc consistency on many problems.
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with quantitative preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). Such problems are more expressive than the classical stable marriage problems. Moreover, in some real-life situations it is more natural to express scores (to model, for example, profits or costs) rather than a qualitative preference ordering. In this context, we define new notions of stability and optimality, and we provide algorithms to find marriages which are stable and/or optimal according to these notions. While expressivity greatly increases by adopting quantitative preferences, we show that in most cases the desired solutions can be found by adapting existing algorithms for the classical stable marriage problem.
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is increasing concern that such results may not re ect the difficulty of manipulation in practice. In this tutorial, I survey recent results in this area.
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions from the bin-packing and multiprocessor scheduling domains. Although we have not been able to show that these algorithms beat existing methods in the worst-case, our empirical evaluation shows that they significantly outperform the existing method and are able to find optimal manipulations in the vast majority of the randomly generated elections that we tested. These empirical results provide further evidence that the Borda rule provides little defense against coalitional manipulation.
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.