A major limitation to advances in fingerprint spoof detection is the lack of publicly available, large-scale fingerprint spoof datasets, a problem which has been compounded by increased concerns surrounding privacy and security of biometric data. Furthermore, most state-of-the-art spoof detection algorithms rely on deep networks which perform best in the presence of a large amount of training data. This work aims to demonstrate the utility of synthetic (both live and spoof) fingerprints in supplying these algorithms with sufficient data to improve the performance of fingerprint spoof detection algorithms beyond the capabilities when training on a limited amount of publicly available real datasets. First, we provide details of our approach in modifying a state-of-the-art generative architecture to synthesize high quality live and spoof fingerprints. Then, we provide quantitative and qualitative analysis to verify the quality of our synthetic fingerprints in mimicking the distribution of real data samples. We showcase the utility of our synthetic live and spoof fingerprints in training a deep network for fingerprint spoof detection, which dramatically boosts the performance across three different evaluation datasets compared to an identical model trained on real data alone. Finally, we demonstrate that only 25% of the original (real) dataset is required to obtain similar detection performance when augmenting the training dataset with synthetic data.
A major impediment to researchers working in the area of fingerprint recognition is the lack of publicly available, large-scale, fingerprint datasets. The publicly available datasets that do exist contain very few identities and impressions per finger. This limits research on a number of topics, including e.g., using deep networks to learn fixed length fingerprint embeddings. Therefore, we propose PrintsGAN, a synthetic fingerprint generator capable of generating unique fingerprints along with multiple impressions for a given fingerprint. Using PrintsGAN, we synthesize a database of 525k fingerprints (35K distinct fingers, each with 15 impressions). Next, we show the utility of the PrintsGAN generated dataset by training a deep network to extract a fixed-length embedding from a fingerprint. In particular, an embedding model trained on our synthetic fingerprints and fine-tuned on a small number of publicly available real fingerprints (25K prints from NIST SD302) obtains a TAR of 87.03% @ FAR=0.01% on the NIST SD4 database (a boost from TAR=73.37% when only trained on NIST SD302). Prevailing synthetic fingerprint generation methods do not enable such performance gains due to i) lack of realism or ii) inability to generate multiple impressions per finger. We plan to release our database of synthetic fingerprints to the public.
Matching contactless fingerprints or finger photos to contact-based fingerprint impressions has received increased attention in the wake of COVID-19 due to the superior hygiene of the contactless acquisition and the widespread availability of low cost mobile phones capable of capturing photos of fingerprints with sufficient resolution for verification purposes. This paper presents an end-to-end automated system, called C2CL, comprised of a mobile finger photo capture app, preprocessing, and matching algorithms to handle the challenges inhibiting previous cross-matching methods; namely i) low ridge-valley contrast of contactless fingerprints, ii) varying roll, pitch, yaw, and distance of the finger to the camera, iii) non-linear distortion of contact-based fingerprints, and vi) different image qualities of smartphone cameras. Our preprocessing algorithm segments, enhances, scales, and unwarps contactless fingerprints, while our matching algorithm extracts both minutiae and texture representations. A sequestered dataset of 9,888 contactless 2D fingerprints and corresponding contact-based fingerprints from 206 subjects (2 thumbs and 2 index fingers for each subject) acquired using our mobile capture app is used to evaluate the cross-database performance of our proposed algorithm. Furthermore, additional experimental results on 3 publicly available datasets demonstrate, for the first time, contact to contactless fingerprint matching accuracy that is comparable to existing contact to contact fingerprint matching systems (TAR in the range of 96.67% to 98.15% at FAR=0.01%).
Typical evaluations of fingerprint recognition systems consist of end-to-end black-box evaluations, which assess performance in terms of overall identification or authentication accuracy. However, these black-box tests of system performance do not reveal insights into the performance of the individual modules, including image acquisition, feature extraction, and matching. On the other hand, white-box evaluations, the topic of this paper, measure the individual performance of each constituent module in isolation. While a few studies have conducted white-box evaluations of the fingerprint reader, feature extractor, and matching components, no existing study has provided a full system, white-box analysis of the uncertainty introduced at each stage of a fingerprint recognition system. In this work, we extend previous white-box evaluations of fingerprint recognition system components and provide a unified, in-depth analysis of fingerprint recognition system performance based on the aggregated white-box evaluation results. In particular, we analyze the uncertainty introduced at each stage of the fingerprint recognition system due to adverse capture conditions (i.e., varying illumination, moisture, and pressure) at the time of acquisition. Our experiments show that a system that performs better overall, in terms of black-box recognition performance, does not necessarily perform best at each module in the fingerprint recognition system pipeline, which can only be seen with white-box analysis of each sub-module. Findings such as these enable researchers to better focus their efforts in improving fingerprint recognition systems.
The vulnerability of automated fingerprint recognition systems to presentation attacks (PA), i.e., spoof or altered fingers, has been a growing concern, warranting the development of accurate and efficient presentation attack detection (PAD) methods. However, one major limitation of the existing PAD solutions is their poor generalization to new PA materials and fingerprint sensors, not used in training. In this study, we propose a robust PAD solution with improved cross-material and cross-sensor generalization. Specifically, we build on top of any CNN-based architecture trained for fingerprint spoof detection combined with cross-material spoof generalization using a style transfer network wrapper. We also incorporate adversarial representation learning (ARL) in deep neural networks (DNN) to learn sensor and material invariant representations for PAD. Experimental results on LivDet 2015 and 2017 public domain datasets exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Prevailing evaluations of fingerprint recognition systems have been performed as end-to-end black-box tests of fingerprint identification or verification accuracy. However, performance of the end-to-end system is subject to errors arising in any of the constituent modules, including: fingerprint reader, preprocessing, feature extraction, and matching. While a few studies have conducted white-box testing of the fingerprint reader and feature extraction modules of fingerprint recognition systems, little work has been devoted towards white-box evaluations of the fingerprint matching sub-module. We report results of a controlled, white-box evaluation of one open-source and two commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) state-of-the-art minutiae-based matchers in terms of their robustness against controlled perturbations (random noise, and non-linear distortions) introduced into the input minutiae feature sets. Experiments were conducted on 10,000 synthetically generated fingerprints. Our white-box evaluations show performance comparisons between different minutiae-based matchers in the presence of various perturbations and non-linear distortion, which were not previously shown with black-box tests. Furthermore, our white-box evaluations reveal that the performance of fingerprint minutiae matchers are more susceptible to non-linear distortion and missing minutiae than spurious minutiae and small positional displacements of the minutiae locations. The measurement uncertainty in fingerprint matching is also developed.