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Simon Rey

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Let's Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics

Apr 28, 2022
Sirin Botan, Simon Rey, Zoi Terzopoulou

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An Optimal Procedure to Check Pareto-Optimality in House Markets with Single-Peaked Preferences

Feb 14, 2020
Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams

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Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores

Jul 16, 2019
Haris Aziz, Simon Rey

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House Markets and Single-Peaked Preferences: From Centralized to Decentralized Allocation Procedures

Jun 24, 2019
Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams

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Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods

Jul 28, 2018
Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey

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