Building autonomous vehicles (AVs) is a complex problem, but enabling them to operate in the real world where they will be surrounded by human-driven vehicles (HVs) is extremely challenging. Prior works have shown the possibilities of creating inter-agent cooperation between a group of AVs that follow a social utility. Such altruistic AVs can form alliances and affect the behavior of HVs to achieve socially desirable outcomes. We identify two major challenges in the co-existence of AVs and HVs. First, social preferences and individual traits of a given human driver, e.g., selflessness and aggressiveness are unknown to an AV, and it is almost impossible to infer them in real-time during a short AV-HV interaction. Second, contrary to AVs that are expected to follow a policy, HVs do not necessarily follow a stationary policy and therefore are extremely hard to predict. To alleviate the above-mentioned challenges, we formulate the mixed-autonomy problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problem and propose a decentralized framework and reward function for training cooperative AVs. Our approach enables AVs to learn the decision-making of HVs implicitly from experience, optimizes for a social utility while prioritizing safety and allowing adaptability; robustifying altruistic AVs to different human behaviors and constraining them to a safe action space. Finally, we investigate the robustness, safety and sensitivity of AVs to various HVs behavioral traits and present the settings in which the AVs can learn cooperative policies that are adaptable to different situations.
In the past two decades we have seen the popularity of neural networks increase in conjunction with their classification accuracy. Parallel to this, we have also witnessed how fragile the very same prediction models are: tiny perturbations to the inputs can cause misclassification errors throughout entire datasets. In this paper, we consider perturbations bounded by the $\ell_0$--norm, which have been shown as effective attacks in the domains of image-recognition, natural language processing, and malware-detection. To this end, we propose a novel defense method that consists of "truncation" and "adversarial training". We then theoretically study the Gaussian mixture setting and prove the asymptotic optimality of our proposed classifier. Motivated by the insights we obtain, we extend these components to neural network classifiers. We conduct numerical experiments in the domain of computer vision using the MNIST and CIFAR datasets, demonstrating significant improvement for the robust classification error of neural networks.
Machine learning models are known to be susceptible to adversarial attacks which can cause misclassification by introducing small but well designed perturbations. In this paper, we consider a classical hypothesis testing problem in order to develop fundamental insight into defending against such adversarial perturbations. We interpret an adversarial perturbation as a nuisance parameter, and propose a defense based on applying the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) to the resulting composite hypothesis testing problem, jointly estimating the class of interest and the adversarial perturbation. While the GLRT approach is applicable to general multi-class hypothesis testing, we first evaluate it for binary hypothesis testing in white Gaussian noise under $\ell_{\infty}$ norm-bounded adversarial perturbations, for which a known minimax defense optimizing for the worst-case attack provides a benchmark. We derive the worst-case attack for the GLRT defense, and show that its asymptotic performance (as the dimension of the data increases) approaches that of the minimax defense. For non-asymptotic regimes, we show via simulations that the GLRT defense is competitive with the minimax approach under the worst-case attack, while yielding a better robustness-accuracy tradeoff under weaker attacks. We also illustrate the GLRT approach for a multi-class hypothesis testing problem, for which a minimax strategy is not known, evaluating its performance under both noise-agnostic and noise-aware adversarial settings, by providing a method to find optimal noise-aware attacks, and heuristics to find noise-agnostic attacks that are close to optimal in the high SNR regime.
Training intelligent agents that can drive autonomously in various urban and highway scenarios has been a hot topic in the robotics society within the last decades. However, the diversity of driving environments in terms of road topology and positioning of the neighboring vehicles makes this problem very challenging. It goes without saying that although scenario-specific driving policies for autonomous driving are promising and can improve transportation safety and efficiency, they are clearly not a universal scalable solution. Instead, we seek decision-making schemes and driving policies that can generalize to novel and unseen environments. In this work, we capitalize on the key idea that human drivers learn abstract representations of their surroundings that are fairly similar among various driving scenarios and environments. Through these representations, human drivers are able to quickly adapt to novel environments and drive in unseen conditions. Formally, through imposing an information bottleneck, we extract a latent representation that minimizes the \textit{distance} -- a quantification that we introduce to gauge the similarity among different driving configurations -- between driving scenarios. This latent space is then employed as the input to a Q-learning module to learn generalizable driving policies. Our experiments revealed that, using this latent representation can reduce the number of crashes to about half.
Despite the advances in the autonomous driving domain, autonomous vehicles (AVs) are still inefficient and limited in terms of cooperating with each other or coordinating with vehicles operated by humans. A group of autonomous and human-driven vehicles (HVs) which work together to optimize an altruistic social utility -- as opposed to the egoistic individual utility -- can co-exist seamlessly and assure safety and efficiency on the road. Achieving this mission without explicit coordination among agents is challenging, mainly due to the difficulty of predicting the behavior of humans with heterogeneous preferences in mixed-autonomy environments. Formally, we model an AV's maneuver planning in mixed-autonomy traffic as a partially-observable stochastic game and attempt to derive optimal policies that lead to socially-desirable outcomes using a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework. We introduce a quantitative representation of the AVs' social preferences and design a distributed reward structure that induces altruism into their decision making process. Our altruistic AVs are able to form alliances, guide the traffic, and affect the behavior of the HVs to handle competitive driving scenarios. As a case study, we compare egoistic AVs to our altruistic autonomous agents in a highway merging setting and demonstrate the emerging behaviors that lead to a noticeable improvement in the number of successful merges as well as the overall traffic flow and safety.
With the adoption of autonomous vehicles on our roads, we will witness a mixed-autonomy environment where autonomous and human-driven vehicles must learn to co-exist by sharing the same road infrastructure. To attain socially-desirable behaviors, autonomous vehicles must be instructed to consider the utility of other vehicles around them in their decision-making process. Particularly, we study the maneuver planning problem for autonomous vehicles and investigate how a decentralized reward structure can induce altruism in their behavior and incentivize them to account for the interest of other autonomous and human-driven vehicles. This is a challenging problem due to the ambiguity of a human driver's willingness to cooperate with an autonomous vehicle. Thus, in contrast with the existing works which rely on behavior models of human drivers, we take an end-to-end approach and let the autonomous agents to implicitly learn the decision-making process of human drivers only from experience. We introduce a multi-agent variant of the synchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm and train agents that coordinate with each other and can affect the behavior of human drivers to improve traffic flow and safety.
Despite the leaps in the autonomous driving domain, autonomous vehicles (AVs) are still inefficient and limited in terms of cooperating with each other or coordinating with vehicles operated by humans. A group of autonomous and human-driven vehicles (HVs) which work together to optimize an altruistic social utility -- as opposed to the egoistic individual utility -- can co-exist seamlessly and assure safety and efficiency on the road. Achieving this mission is challenging in the absence of explicit coordination among agents. Additionally, existence of humans in mixed-autonomy environments create social dilemmas as they are known to be heterogeneous in social preference and their behavior is hard to predict by nature. Formally, we model an AV's maneuver planning in mixed-autonomy traffic as a partially-observable stochastic game and attempt to derive optimal policies that lead to socially-desirable outcomes using our multi-agent reinforcement learning framework. We introduce a quantitative representation of the AVs' social value orientation and design a distributed reward structure that induces altruism into their decision making process. Our trained altruistic AVs are able to form alliances, guide the traffic, and affect the behavior of the HVs to handle conflictive and competitive driving scenarios. As a case study, we compare egoistic AVs to our altruistic autonomous agents in a highway merging case study and demonstrate a significant improvement in the number of successful merges as well as the overall traffic flow and safety.
Widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles will not become a reality until solutions are developed that enable these intelligent agents to co-exist with humans. This includes safely and efficiently interacting with human-driven vehicles, especially in both conflictive and competitive scenarios. We build up on the prior work on socially-aware navigation and borrow the concept of social value orientation from psychology -- that formalizes how much importance a person allocates to the welfare of others -- in order to induce altruistic behavior in autonomous driving. In contrast with existing works that explicitly model the behavior of human drivers and rely on their expected response to create opportunities for cooperation, our Sympathetic Cooperative Driving (SymCoDrive) paradigm trains altruistic agents that realize safe and smooth traffic flow in competitive driving scenarios only from experiential learning and without any explicit coordination. We demonstrate a significant improvement in both safety and traffic-level metrics as a result of this altruistic behavior and importantly conclude that the level of altruism in agents requires proper tuning as agents that are too altruistic also lead to sub-optimal traffic flow. The code and supplementary material are available at: https://symcodrive.toghi.net/
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equilibria while allowing agents to remain selfish and decentralized. Gifting allows each agent to give some of their reward to other agents. We employ a theoretical framework that captures the benefit of gifting in converging to the prosocial equilibrium by characterizing the equilibria's basins of attraction in a dynamical system. With gifting, we demonstrate increased convergence of high risk, general-sum coordination games to the prosocial equilibrium both via numerical analysis and experiments.