A major threat to the peer-review systems of computer science conferences is the existence of "collusion rings" between reviewers. In such collusion rings, reviewers who have also submitted their own papers to the conference work together to manipulate the conference's paper assignment, with the aim of being assigned to review each other's papers. The most straightforward way that colluding reviewers can manipulate the paper assignment is by indicating their interest in each other's papers through strategic paper bidding. One potential approach to solve this important problem would be to detect the colluding reviewers from their manipulated bids, after which the conference can take appropriate action. While prior work has has developed effective techniques to detect other kinds of fraud, no research has yet established that detecting collusion rings is even possible. In this work, we tackle the question of whether it is feasible to detect collusion rings from the paper bidding. To answer this question, we conduct empirical analysis of two realistic conference bidding datasets, including evaluations of existing algorithms for fraud detection in other applications. We find that collusion rings can achieve considerable success at manipulating the paper assignment while remaining hidden from detection: for example, in one dataset, undetected colluders are able to achieve assignment to up to 30% of the papers authored by other colluders. In addition, when 10 colluders bid on all of each other's papers, no detection algorithm outputs a group of reviewers with more than 31% overlap with the true colluders. These results suggest that collusion cannot be effectively detected from the bidding, demonstrating the need to develop more complex detection algorithms that leverage additional metadata.
Given the rapid ascent of large language models (LLMs), we study the question: (How) can large language models help in reviewing of scientific papers or proposals? We first conduct some pilot studies where we find that (i) GPT-4 outperforms other LLMs (Bard, Vicuna, Koala, Alpaca, LLaMa, Dolly, OpenAssistant, StableLM), and (ii) prompting with a specific question (e.g., to identify errors) outperforms prompting to simply write a review. With these insights, we study the use of LLMs (specifically, GPT-4) for three tasks: 1. Identifying errors: We construct 13 short computer science papers each with a deliberately inserted error, and ask the LLM to check for the correctness of these papers. We observe that the LLM finds errors in 7 of them, spanning both mathematical and conceptual errors. 2. Verifying checklists: We task the LLM to verify 16 closed-ended checklist questions in the respective sections of 15 NeurIPS 2022 papers. We find that across 119 {checklist question, paper} pairs, the LLM had an 86.6% accuracy. 3. Choosing the "better" paper: We generate 10 pairs of abstracts, deliberately designing each pair in such a way that one abstract was clearly superior than the other. The LLM, however, struggled to discern these relatively straightforward distinctions accurately, committing errors in its evaluations for 6 out of the 10 pairs. Based on these experiments, we think that LLMs have a promising use as reviewing assistants for specific reviewing tasks, but not (yet) for complete evaluations of papers or proposals.
Peer review assignment algorithms aim to match research papers to suitable expert reviewers, working to maximize the quality of the resulting reviews. A key challenge in designing effective assignment policies is evaluating how changes to the assignment algorithm map to changes in review quality. In this work, we leverage recently proposed policies that introduce randomness in peer-review assignment--in order to mitigate fraud--as a valuable opportunity to evaluate counterfactual assignment policies. Specifically, we exploit how such randomized assignments provide a positive probability of observing the reviews of many assignment policies of interest. To address challenges in applying standard off-policy evaluation methods, such as violations of positivity, we introduce novel methods for partial identification based on monotonicity and Lipschitz smoothness assumptions for the mapping between reviewer-paper covariates and outcomes. We apply our methods to peer-review data from two computer science venues: the TPDP'21 workshop (95 papers and 35 reviewers) and the AAAI'22 conference (8,450 papers and 3,145 reviewers). We consider estimates of (i) the effect on review quality when changing weights in the assignment algorithm, e.g., weighting reviewers' bids vs. textual similarity (between the review's past papers and the submission), and (ii) the "cost of randomization", capturing the difference in expected quality between the perturbed and unperturbed optimal match. We find that placing higher weight on text similarity results in higher review quality and that introducing randomization in the reviewer-paper assignment only marginally reduces the review quality. Our methods for partial identification may be of independent interest, while our off-policy approach can likely find use evaluating a broad class of algorithmic matching systems.
Many peer-review venues are either using or looking to use algorithms to assign submissions to reviewers. The crux of such automated approaches is the notion of the "similarity score"--a numerical estimate of the expertise of a reviewer in reviewing a paper--and many algorithms have been proposed to compute these scores. However, these algorithms have not been subjected to a principled comparison, making it difficult for stakeholders to choose the algorithm in an evidence-based manner. The key challenge in comparing existing algorithms and developing better algorithms is the lack of the publicly available gold-standard data that would be needed to perform reproducible research. We address this challenge by collecting a novel dataset of similarity scores that we release to the research community. Our dataset consists of 477 self-reported expertise scores provided by 58 researchers who evaluated their expertise in reviewing papers they have read previously. We use this data to compare several popular algorithms employed in computer science conferences and come up with recommendations for stakeholders. Our main findings are as follows. First, all algorithms make a non-trivial amount of error. For the task of ordering two papers in terms of their relevance for a reviewer, the error rates range from 12%-30% in easy cases to 36%-43% in hard cases, highlighting the vital need for more research on the similarity-computation problem. Second, most existing algorithms are designed to work with titles and abstracts of papers, and in this regime the Specter+MFR algorithm performs best. Third, to improve performance, it may be important to develop modern deep-learning based algorithms that can make use of the full texts of papers: the classical TD-IDF algorithm enhanced with full texts of papers is on par with the deep-learning based Specter+MFR that cannot make use of this information.
Many practical applications, ranging from paper-reviewer assignment in peer review to job-applicant matching for hiring, require human decision makers to identify relevant matches by combining their expertise with predictions from machine learning models. In many such model-assisted document matching tasks, the decision makers have stressed the need for assistive information about the model outputs (or the data) to facilitate their decisions. In this paper, we devise a proxy matching task that allows us to evaluate which kinds of assistive information improve decision makers' performance (in terms of accuracy and time). Through a crowdsourced (N=271 participants) study, we find that providing black-box model explanations reduces users' accuracy on the matching task, contrary to the commonly-held belief that they can be helpful by allowing better understanding of the model. On the other hand, custom methods that are designed to closely attend to some task-specific desiderata are found to be effective in improving user performance. Surprisingly, we also find that the users' perceived utility of assistive information is misaligned with their objective utility (measured through their task performance).
How do author perceptions match up to the outcomes of the peer-review process and perceptions of others? In a top-tier computer science conference (NeurIPS 2021) with more than 23,000 submitting authors and 9,000 submitted papers, we survey the authors on three questions: (i) their predicted probability of acceptance for each of their papers, (ii) their perceived ranking of their own papers based on scientific contribution, and (iii) the change in their perception about their own papers after seeing the reviews. The salient results are: (1) Authors have roughly a three-fold overestimate of the acceptance probability of their papers: The median prediction is 70% for an approximately 25% acceptance rate. (2) Female authors exhibit a marginally higher (statistically significant) miscalibration than male authors; predictions of authors invited to serve as meta-reviewers or reviewers are similarly calibrated, but better than authors who were not invited to review. (3) Authors' relative ranking of scientific contribution of two submissions they made generally agree (93%) with their predicted acceptance probabilities, but there is a notable 7% responses where authors think their better paper will face a worse outcome. (4) The author-provided rankings disagreed with the peer-review decisions about a third of the time; when co-authors ranked their jointly authored papers, co-authors disagreed at a similar rate -- about a third of the time. (5) At least 30% of respondents of both accepted and rejected papers said that their perception of their own paper improved after the review process. The stakeholders in peer review should take these findings into account in setting their expectations from peer review.
Many applications such as hiring and university admissions involve evaluation and selection of applicants. These tasks are fundamentally difficult, and require combining evidence from multiple different aspects (what we term "attributes"). In these applications, the number of applicants is often large, and a common practice is to assign the task to multiple evaluators in a distributed fashion. Specifically, in the often-used holistic allocation, each evaluator is assigned a subset of the applicants, and is asked to assess all relevant information for their assigned applicants. However, such an evaluation process is subject to issues such as miscalibration (evaluators see only a small fraction of the applicants and may not get a good sense of relative quality), and discrimination (evaluators are influenced by irrelevant information about the applicants). We identify that such attribute-based evaluation allows alternative allocation schemes. Specifically, we consider assigning each evaluator more applicants but fewer attributes per applicant, termed segmented allocation. We compare segmented allocation to holistic allocation on several dimensions via theoretical and experimental methods. We establish various tradeoffs between these two approaches, and identify conditions under which one approach results in more accurate evaluation than the other.
Many conferences rely on paper bidding as a key component of their reviewer assignment procedure. These bids are then taken into account when assigning reviewers to help ensure that each reviewer is assigned to suitable papers. However, despite the benefits of using bids, reliance on paper bidding can allow malicious reviewers to manipulate the paper assignment for unethical purposes (e.g., getting assigned to a friend's paper). Several different approaches to preventing this manipulation have been proposed and deployed. In this paper, we enumerate certain desirable properties that algorithms for addressing bid manipulation should satisfy. We then offer a high-level analysis of various approaches along with directions for future investigation.
In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to provide "bids" on each submitted paper that express their interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to compute a high-quality assignment of reviewers to papers. However, this process has been exploited by malicious reviewers who strategically bid in order to unethically manipulate the paper assignment, crucially undermining the peer review process. For example, these reviewers may aim to get assigned to a friend's paper as part of a quid-pro-quo deal. A critical impediment towards creating and evaluating methods to mitigate this issue is the lack of any publicly-available data on malicious paper bidding. In this work, we collect and publicly release a novel dataset to fill this gap, collected from a mock conference activity where participants were instructed to bid either honestly or maliciously. We further provide a descriptive analysis of the bidding behavior, including our categorization of different strategies employed by participants. Finally, we evaluate the ability of each strategy to manipulate the assignment, and also evaluate the performance of some simple algorithms meant to detect malicious bidding. The performance of these detection algorithms can be taken as a baseline for future research on detecting malicious bidding.
In peer review, reviewers are usually asked to provide scores for the papers. The scores are then used by Area Chairs or Program Chairs in various ways in the decision-making process. The scores are usually elicited in a quantized form to accommodate the limited cognitive ability of humans to describe their opinions in numerical values. It has been found that the quantized scores suffer from a large number of ties, thereby leading to a significant loss of information. To mitigate this issue, conferences have started to ask reviewers to additionally provide a ranking of the papers they have reviewed. There are however two key challenges. First, there is no standard procedure for using this ranking information and Area Chairs may use it in different ways (including simply ignoring them), thereby leading to arbitrariness in the peer-review process. Second, there are no suitable interfaces for judicious use of this data nor methods to incorporate it in existing workflows, thereby leading to inefficiencies. We take a principled approach to integrate the ranking information into the scores. The output of our method is an updated score pertaining to each review that also incorporates the rankings. Our approach addresses the two aforementioned challenges by: (i) ensuring that rankings are incorporated into the updates scores in the same manner for all papers, thereby mitigating arbitrariness, and (ii) allowing to seamlessly use existing interfaces and workflows designed for scores. We empirically evaluate our method on synthetic datasets as well as on peer reviews from the ICLR 2017 conference, and find that it reduces the error by approximately 30% as compared to the best performing baseline on the ICLR 2017 data.