Policy space response oracles (PSRO) is a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that has achieved state-of-the-art performance in very large two-player zero-sum games. PSRO is based on the tabular double oracle (DO) method, an algorithm that is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium, but may increase exploitability from one iteration to the next. We propose anytime double oracle (ADO), a tabular double oracle algorithm for 2-player zero-sum games that is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium while decreasing exploitability from one iteration to the next. Unlike DO, in which the restricted distribution is based on the restricted game formed by each player's strategy sets, ADO finds the restricted distribution for each player that minimizes its exploitability against any policy in the full, unrestricted game. We also propose a method of finding this restricted distribution via a no-regret algorithm updated against best responses, called RM-BR DO. Finally, we propose anytime PSRO (APSRO), a version of ADO that calculates best responses via reinforcement learning. In experiments on Leduc poker and random normal form games, we show that our methods achieve far lower exploitability than DO and PSRO and decrease exploitability monotonically.
Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm for games that can handle continuous actions and has empirically found approximate Nash equilibria in large games. PSRO is based on the tabular Double Oracle (DO) method, an algorithm that is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium, but may increase exploitability from one iteration to the next. We propose Anytime Optimal Double Oracle (AODO), a tabular double oracle algorithm for 2-player zero-sum games that is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium while decreasing exploitability from iteration to iteration. Unlike DO, in which the meta-strategy is based on the restricted game formed by each player's strategy sets, AODO finds the meta-strategy for each player that minimizes its exploitability against any policy in the full, unrestricted game. We also propose a method of finding this meta-strategy via a no-regret algorithm updated against a continually-trained best response, called RM-BR DO. Finally, we propose Anytime Optimal PSRO, a version of AODO that calculates best responses via reinforcement learning. In experiments on Leduc poker and random normal form games, we show that our methods achieve far lower exploitability than DO and PSRO and never increase exploitability.
Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests. In domains where agents can choose to take their own action or delegate their action to a central mediator, an open question is how mediators should take actions on behalf of delegating agents. The main existing approach uses delegating agents to punish non-delegating agents in an attempt to get all agents to delegate, which tends to be costly for all. We introduce a Pareto Mediator which aims to improve outcomes for delegating agents without making any of them worse off. Our experiments in random normal form games, a restaurant recommendation game, and a reinforcement learning sequential social dilemma show that the Pareto Mediator greatly increases social welfare. Also, even when the Pareto Mediator is based on an incorrect model of agent utility, performance gracefully degrades to the pre-intervention level, due to the individual autonomy preserved by the voluntary mediator.
Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm for two-player zero-sum games that has empirically found approximate Nash equilibria in large games. Although PSRO is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium, it may take an exponential number of iterations as the number of infostates grows. We propose Extensive-Form Double Oracle (XDO), an extensive-form double oracle algorithm that is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium linearly in the number of infostates. Unlike PSRO, which mixes best responses at the root of the game, XDO mixes best responses at every infostate. We also introduce Neural XDO (NXDO), where the best response is learned through deep RL. In tabular experiments on Leduc poker, we find that XDO achieves an approximate Nash equilibrium in a number of iterations 1-2 orders of magnitude smaller than PSRO. In experiments on a modified Leduc poker game, we show that tabular XDO achieves over 11x lower exploitability than CFR and over 82x lower exploitability than PSRO and XFP in the same amount of time. We also show that NXDO beats PSRO and is competitive with NFSP on a large no-limit poker game.
Finding approximate Nash equilibria in zero-sum imperfect-information games is challenging when the number of information states is large. Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm grounded in game theory that is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. However, PSRO requires training a reinforcement learning policy at each iteration, making it too slow for large games. We show through counterexamples and experiments that DCH and Rectified PSRO, two existing approaches to scaling up PSRO, fail to converge even in small games. We introduce Pipeline PSRO (P2SRO), the first scalable general method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum imperfect-information games. P2SRO is able to parallelize PSRO with convergence guarantees by maintaining a hierarchical pipeline of reinforcement learning workers, each training against the policies generated by lower levels in the hierarchy. We show that unlike existing methods, P2SRO converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, and does so faster as the number of parallel workers increases, across a variety of imperfect information games. We also introduce an open-source environment for Barrage Stratego, a variant of Stratego with an approximate game tree complexity of $10^{50}$. P2SRO is able to achieve state-of-the-art performance on Barrage Stratego and beats all existing bots.