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Georgios Piliouras

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Learning in Matrix Games can be Arbitrarily Complex

Mar 05, 2021
Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael Frongillo, Georgios Piliouras

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Scaling up Mean Field Games with Online Mirror Descent

Feb 28, 2021
Julien Perolat, Sarah Perrin, Romuald Elie, Mathieu Laurière, Georgios Piliouras, Matthieu Geist, Karl Tuyls, Olivier Pietquin

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Follow-the-Regularized-Leader Routes to Chaos in Routing Games

Feb 17, 2021
Jakub Bielawski, Thiparat Chotibut, Fryderyk Falniowski, Grzegorz Kosiorowski, Michał Misiurewicz, Georgios Piliouras

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Solving Min-Max Optimization with Hidden Structure via Gradient Descent Ascent

Jan 13, 2021
Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Georgios Piliouras

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Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games

Dec 15, 2020
Stratis Skoulakis, Tanner Fiez, Ryann Sim, Georgios Piliouras, Lillian Ratliff

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Efficient Online Learning of Optimal Rankings: Dimensionality Reduction via Gradient Descent

Nov 05, 2020
Dimitris Fotakis, Thanasis Lianeas, Georgios Piliouras, Stratis Skoulakis

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No-regret learning and mixed Nash equilibria: They do not mix

Oct 20, 2020
Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Thanasis Lianeas, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Georgios Piliouras

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No-regreet learning and mixed Nash equilibria: They do not mix

Oct 19, 2020
Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Thanasis Lianeas, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Georgios Piliouras

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Chaos, Extremism and Optimism: Volume Analysis of Learning in Games

May 28, 2020
Yun Kuen Cheung, Georgios Piliouras

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From Poincaré Recurrence to Convergence in Imperfect Information Games: Finding Equilibrium via Regularization

Feb 19, 2020
Julien Perolat, Remi Munos, Jean-Baptiste Lespiau, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Mark Rowland, Pedro Ortega, Neil Burch, Thomas Anthony, David Balduzzi, Bart De Vylder, Georgios Piliouras, Marc Lanctot, Karl Tuyls

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