Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.
Much discussion about large language models and language-and-vision models has focused on whether these models are intelligent agents. We present an alternative perspective. We argue that these artificial intelligence models are cultural technologies that enhance cultural transmission in the modern world, and are efficient imitation engines. We explore what AI models can tell us about imitation and innovation by evaluating their capacity to design new tools and discover novel causal structures, and contrast their responses with those of human children. Our work serves as a first step in determining which particular representations and competences, as well as which kinds of knowledge or skill, can be derived from particular learning techniques and data. Critically, our findings suggest that machines may need more than large scale language and images to achieve what a child can do.
Recent work in machine learning and cognitive science has suggested that understanding causal information is essential to the development of intelligence. The extensive literature in cognitive science using the ``blicket detector'' environment shows that children are adept at many kinds of causal inference and learning. We propose to adapt that environment for machine learning agents. One of the key challenges for current machine learning algorithms is modeling and understanding causal overhypotheses: transferable abstract hypotheses about sets of causal relationships. In contrast, even young children spontaneously learn and use causal overhypotheses. In this work, we present a new benchmark -- a flexible environment which allows for the evaluation of existing techniques under variable causal overhypotheses -- and demonstrate that many existing state-of-the-art methods have trouble generalizing in this environment. The code and resources for this benchmark are available at https://github.com/CannyLab/casual_overhypotheses.
Despite recent progress in reinforcement learning (RL), RL algorithms for exploration still remain an active area of research. Existing methods often focus on state-based metrics, which do not consider the underlying causal structures of the environment, and while recent research has begun to explore RL environments for causal learning, these environments primarily leverage causal information through causal inference or induction rather than exploration. In contrast, human children - some of the most proficient explorers - have been shown to use causal information to great benefit. In this work, we introduce a novel RL environment designed with a controllable causal structure, which allows us to evaluate exploration strategies used by both agents and children in a unified environment. In addition, through experimentation on both computation models and children, we demonstrate that there are significant differences between information-gain optimal RL exploration in causal environments and the exploration of children in the same environments. We conclude with a discussion of how these findings may inspire new directions of research into efficient exploration and disambiguation of causal structures for RL algorithms.
Research in developmental psychology consistently shows that children explore the world thoroughly and efficiently and that this exploration allows them to learn. In turn, this early learning supports more robust generalization and intelligent behavior later in life. While much work has gone into developing methods for exploration in machine learning, artificial agents have not yet reached the high standard set by their human counterparts. In this work we propose using DeepMind Lab (Beattie et al., 2016) as a platform to directly compare child and agent behaviors and to develop new exploration techniques. We outline two ongoing experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of a direct comparison, and outline a number of open research questions that we believe can be tested using this methodology.
We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.