Language models demonstrate both quantitative improvement and new qualitative capabilities with increasing scale. Despite their potentially transformative impact, these new capabilities are as yet poorly characterized. In order to inform future research, prepare for disruptive new model capabilities, and ameliorate socially harmful effects, it is vital that we understand the present and near-future capabilities and limitations of language models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Beyond the Imitation Game benchmark (BIG-bench). BIG-bench currently consists of 204 tasks, contributed by 442 authors across 132 institutions. Task topics are diverse, drawing problems from linguistics, childhood development, math, common-sense reasoning, biology, physics, social bias, software development, and beyond. BIG-bench focuses on tasks that are believed to be beyond the capabilities of current language models. We evaluate the behavior of OpenAI's GPT models, Google-internal dense transformer architectures, and Switch-style sparse transformers on BIG-bench, across model sizes spanning millions to hundreds of billions of parameters. In addition, a team of human expert raters performed all tasks in order to provide a strong baseline. Findings include: model performance and calibration both improve with scale, but are poor in absolute terms (and when compared with rater performance); performance is remarkably similar across model classes, though with benefits from sparsity; tasks that improve gradually and predictably commonly involve a large knowledge or memorization component, whereas tasks that exhibit "breakthrough" behavior at a critical scale often involve multiple steps or components, or brittle metrics; social bias typically increases with scale in settings with ambiguous context, but this can be improved with prompting.
For a natural language understanding benchmark to be useful in research, it has to consist of examples that are diverse and difficult enough to discriminate among current and near-future state-of-the-art systems. However, we do not yet know how best to select text sources to collect a variety of challenging examples. In this study, we crowdsource multiple-choice reading comprehension questions for passages taken from seven qualitatively distinct sources, analyzing what attributes of passages contribute to the difficulty and question types of the collected examples. To our surprise, we find that passage source, length, and readability measures do not significantly affect question difficulty. Through our manual annotation of seven reasoning types, we observe several trends between passage sources and reasoning types, e.g., logical reasoning is more often required in questions written for technical passages. These results suggest that when creating a new benchmark dataset, selecting a diverse set of passages can help ensure a diverse range of question types, but that passage difficulty need not be a priority.
Understanding language requires grasping not only the overtly stated content, but also making inferences about things that were left unsaid. These inferences include presuppositions, a phenomenon by which a listener learns about new information through reasoning about what a speaker takes as given. Presuppositions require complex understanding of the lexical and syntactic properties that trigger them as well as the broader conversational context. In this work, we introduce the Naturally-Occurring Presuppositions in English (NOPE) Corpus to investigate the context-sensitivity of 10 different types of presupposition triggers and to evaluate machine learning models' ability to predict human inferences. We find that most of the triggers we investigate exhibit moderate variability. We further find that transformer-based models draw correct inferences in simple cases involving presuppositions, but they fail to capture the minority of exceptional cases in which human judgments reveal complex interactions between context and triggers.
Crowdsourcing is widely used to create data for common natural language understanding tasks. Despite the importance of these datasets for measuring and refining model understanding of language, there has been little focus on the crowdsourcing methods used for collecting the datasets. In this paper, we compare the efficacy of interventions that have been proposed in prior work as ways of improving data quality. We use multiple-choice question answering as a testbed and run a randomized trial by assigning crowdworkers to write questions under one of four different data collection protocols. We find that asking workers to write explanations for their examples is an ineffective stand-alone strategy for boosting NLU example difficulty. However, we find that training crowdworkers, and then using an iterative process of collecting data, sending feedback, and qualifying workers based on expert judgments is an effective means of collecting challenging data. But using crowdsourced, instead of expert judgments, to qualify workers and send feedback does not prove to be effective. We observe that the data from the iterative protocol with expert assessments is more challenging by several measures. Notably, the human--model gap on the unanimous agreement portion of this data is, on average, twice as large as the gap for the baseline protocol data.
Many crowdsourced NLP datasets contain systematic gaps and biases that are identified only after data collection is complete. Identifying these issues from early data samples during crowdsourcing should make mitigation more efficient, especially when done iteratively. We take natural language inference as a test case and ask whether it is beneficial to put a linguist `in the loop' during data collection to dynamically identify and address gaps in the data by introducing novel constraints on the task. We directly compare three data collection protocols: (i) a baseline protocol, (ii) a linguist-in-the-loop intervention with iteratively-updated constraints on the task, and (iii) an extension of linguist-in-the-loop that provides direct interaction between linguists and crowdworkers via a chatroom. The datasets collected with linguist involvement are more reliably challenging than baseline, without loss of quality. But we see no evidence that using this data in training leads to better out-of-domain model performance, and the addition of a chat platform has no measurable effect on the resulting dataset. We suggest integrating expert analysis \textit{during} data collection so that the expert can dynamically address gaps and biases in the dataset.
Linguistically informed analyses of language models (LMs) contribute to the understanding and improvement of these models. Here, we introduce the corpus of Chinese linguistic minimal pairs (CLiMP), which can be used to investigate what knowledge Chinese LMs acquire. CLiMP consists of sets of 1,000 minimal pairs (MPs) for 16 syntactic contrasts in Mandarin, covering 9 major Mandarin linguistic phenomena. The MPs are semi-automatically generated, and human agreement with the labels in CLiMP is 95.8%. We evaluated 11 different LMs on CLiMP, covering n-grams, LSTMs, and Chinese BERT. We find that classifier-noun agreement and verb complement selection are the phenomena that models generally perform best at. However, models struggle the most with the ba construction, binding, and filler-gap dependencies. Overall, Chinese BERT achieves an 81.8% average accuracy, while the performances of LSTMs and 5-grams are only moderately above chance level.
NLP is currently dominated by general-purpose pretrained language models like RoBERTa, which achieve strong performance on NLU tasks through pretraining on billions of words. But what exact knowledge or skills do Transformer LMs learn from large-scale pretraining that they cannot learn from less data? We adopt four probing methods---classifier probing, information-theoretic probing, unsupervised relative acceptability judgment, and fine-tuning on NLU tasks---and draw learning curves that track the growth of these different measures of linguistic ability with respect to pretraining data volume using the MiniBERTas, a group of RoBERTa models pretrained on 1M, 10M, 100M and 1B words. We find that LMs require only about 10M or 100M words to learn representations that reliably encode most syntactic and semantic features we test. A much larger quantity of data is needed in order to acquire enough commonsense knowledge and other skills required to master typical downstream NLU tasks. The results suggest that, while the ability to encode linguistic features is almost certainly necessary for language understanding, it is likely that other forms of knowledge are the major drivers of recent improvements in language understanding among large pretrained models.
One reason pretraining on self-supervised linguistic tasks is effective is that it teaches models features that are helpful for language understanding. However, we want pretrained models to learn not only to represent linguistic features, but also to use those features preferentially during fine-turning. With this goal in mind, we introduce a new English-language diagnostic set called MSGS (the Mixed Signals Generalization Set), which consists of 20 ambiguous binary classification tasks that we use to test whether a pretrained model prefers linguistic or surface generalizations during fine-tuning. We pretrain RoBERTa models from scratch on quantities of data ranging from 1M to 1B words and compare their performance on MSGS to the publicly available RoBERTa-base. We find that models can learn to represent linguistic features with little pretraining data, but require far more data to learn to prefer linguistic generalizations over surface ones. Eventually, with about 30B words of pretraining data, RoBERTa-base does demonstrate a linguistic bias with some regularity. We conclude that while self-supervised pretraining is an effective way to learn helpful inductive biases, there is likely room to improve the rate at which models learn which features matter.
We evaluate whether BERT, a widely used neural network for sentence processing, acquires an inductive bias towards forming structural generalizations through pretraining on raw data. We conduct four experiments testing its preference for structural vs. linear generalizations in different structure-dependent phenomena. We find that BERT makes a structural generalization in 3 out of 4 empirical domains---subject-auxiliary inversion, reflexive binding, and verb tense detection in embedded clauses---but makes a linear generalization when tested on NPI licensing. We argue that these results are the strongest evidence so far from artificial learners supporting the proposition that a structural bias can be acquired from raw data. If this conclusion is correct, it is tentative evidence that some linguistic universals can be acquired by learners without innate biases. However, the precise implications for human language acquisition are unclear, as humans learn language from significantly less data than BERT.
Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether one sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of 32K semi-automatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, BOW, and InferSent NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI contains vanishingly few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences: it reliably treats implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.