Most modern systems strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition--how such systems balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here the users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing systems. In our model, we consider competition between two multi-armed bandit algorithms faced with the same bandit instance. Users arrive one by one and choose among the two algorithms, so that each algorithm makes progress if and only if it is chosen. We ask whether and to what extent competition incentivizes the adoption of better bandit algorithms. We investigate this issue for several models of user response, as we vary the degree of rationality and competitiveness in the model. Our findings are closely related to the "competition vs. innovation" relationship, a well-studied theme in economics.
Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing $d$ distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply, but can only be produced at a limited rate and are costly to produce. The seller observes only the bundle of goods purchased at each day, but nothing else about the buyer's valuation function. Our main result is a dynamic pricing algorithm for optimizing welfare (including the seller's cost of production) that runs in time and a number of rounds that are polynomial in $d$ and the approximation parameter. We are able to do this despite the fact that (i) the price-response function is not continuous, and even its fractional relaxation is a non-concave function of the prices, and (ii) the welfare is not observable to the seller. We derive this result as an application of a general technique for optimizing welfare over \emph{divisible} goods, which is of independent interest. When buyers have strongly concave, H\"older continuous valuation functions over $d$ divisible goods, we give a general polynomial time dynamic pricing technique. We are able to apply this technique to the setting of unit demand buyers despite the fact that in that setting the goods are not divisible, and the natural fractional relaxation of a unit demand valuation is not strongly concave. In order to apply our general technique, we introduce a novel price randomization procedure which has the effect of implicitly inducing buyers to "regularize" their valuations with a strongly concave function. Finally, we also extend our results to a limited-supply setting in which the number of copies of each good cannot be replenished.
Crowdsourcing has been part of the IR toolbox as a cheap and fast mechanism to obtain labels for system development and evaluation. Successful deployment of crowdsourcing at scale involves adjusting many variables, a very important one being the number of workers needed per human intelligence task (HIT). We consider the crowdsourcing task of learning the answer to simple multiple-choice HITs, which are representative of many relevance experiments. In order to provide statistically significant results, one often needs to ask multiple workers to answer the same HIT. A stopping rule is an algorithm that, given a HIT, decides for any given set of worker answers if the system should stop and output an answer or iterate and ask one more worker. Knowing the historic performance of a worker in the form of a quality score can be beneficial in such a scenario. In this paper we investigate how to devise better stopping rules given such quality scores. We also suggest adaptive exploration as a promising approach for scalable and automatic creation of ground truth. We conduct a data analysis on an industrial crowdsourcing platform, and use the observations from this analysis to design new stopping rules that use the workers' quality scores in a non-trivial manner. We then perform a simulation based on a real-world workload, showing that our algorithm performs better than the more naive approaches.
Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task's requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality of the completed work, for example, through the use of "bonus" payments. In this paper, we study the requester's problem of dynamically adjusting quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a multi-round version of the well-known principal-agent model, whereby in each round a worker makes a strategic choice of the effort level which is not directly observable by the requester. In particular, our formulation significantly generalizes the budget-free online task pricing problems studied in prior work. We treat this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem, with each "arm" representing a potential contract. To cope with the large (and in fact, infinite) number of arms, we propose a new algorithm, AgnosticZooming, which discretizes the contract space into a finite number of regions, effectively treating each region as a single arm. This discretization is adaptively refined, so that more promising regions of the contract space are eventually discretized more finely. We analyze this algorithm, showing that it achieves regret sublinear in the time horizon and substantially improves over non-adaptive discretization (which is the only competing approach in the literature). Our results advance the state of art on several different topics: the theory of crowdsourcing markets, principal-agent problems, multi-armed bandits, and dynamic pricing.
We study contextual bandits with ancillary constraints on resources, which are common in real-world applications such as choosing ads or dynamic pricing of items. We design the first algorithm for solving these problems that handles constrained resources other than time, and improves over a trivial reduction to the non-contextual case. We consider very general settings for both contextual bandits (arbitrary policy sets, e.g. Dudik et al. (UAI'11)) and bandits with resource constraints (bandits with knapsacks, Badanidiyuru et al. (FOCS'13)), and prove a regret guarantee with near-optimal statistical properties.
We consider the problem of learning to choose actions using contextual information when provided with limited feedback in the form of relative pairwise comparisons. We study this problem in the dueling-bandits framework of Yue et al. (2009), which we extend to incorporate context. Roughly, the learner's goal is to find the best policy, or way of behaving, in some space of policies, although "best" is not always so clearly defined. Here, we propose a new and natural solution concept, rooted in game theory, called a von Neumann winner, a randomized policy that beats or ties every other policy. We show that this notion overcomes important limitations of existing solutions, particularly the Condorcet winner which has typically been used in the past, but which requires strong and often unrealistic assumptions. We then present three efficient algorithms for online learning in our setting, and for approximating a von Neumann winner from batch-like data. The first of these algorithms achieves particularly low regret, even when data is adversarial, although its time and space requirements are linear in the size of the policy space. The other two algorithms require time and space only logarithmic in the size of the policy space when provided access to an oracle for solving classification problems on the space.
In a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, an online algorithm makes a sequence of choices. In each round it chooses from a time-invariant set of alternatives and receives the payoff associated with this alternative. While the case of small strategy sets is by now well-understood, a lot of recent work has focused on MAB problems with exponentially or infinitely large strategy sets, where one needs to assume extra structure in order to make the problem tractable. In particular, recent literature considered information on similarity between arms. We consider similarity information in the setting of "contextual bandits", a natural extension of the basic MAB problem where before each round an algorithm is given the "context" -- a hint about the payoffs in this round. Contextual bandits are directly motivated by placing advertisements on webpages, one of the crucial problems in sponsored search. A particularly simple way to represent similarity information in the contextual bandit setting is via a "similarity distance" between the context-arm pairs which gives an upper bound on the difference between the respective expected payoffs. Prior work on contextual bandits with similarity uses "uniform" partitions of the similarity space, which is potentially wasteful. We design more efficient algorithms that are based on adaptive partitions adjusted to "popular" context and "high-payoff" arms.
We consider the problem of dynamic pricing with limited supply. A seller has $k$ identical items for sale and is facing $n$ potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent's value for an item is an IID sample from some fixed distribution with support $[0,1]$. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue. We focus on "prior-independent" mechanisms -- ones that do not use any information about the distribution. They are desirable because knowing the distribution is unrealistic in many practical scenarios. We study how the revenue of such mechanisms compares to the revenue of the optimal offline mechanism that knows the distribution ("offline benchmark"). We present a prior-independent dynamic pricing mechanism whose revenue is at most $O((k \log n)^{2/3})$ less than the offline benchmark, for every distribution that is regular. In fact, this guarantee holds without *any* assumptions if the benchmark is relaxed to fixed-price mechanisms. Further, we prove a matching lower bound. The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved to $O(\sqrt{k} \log n)$, with a distribution-dependent constant, if $k/n$ is sufficiently small. We show that, in the worst case over all demand distributions, this is essentially the best rate that can be obtained with a distribution-specific constant. On a technical level, we exploit the connection to multi-armed bandits (MAB). While dynamic pricing with unlimited supply can easily be seen as an MAB problem, the intuition behind MAB approaches breaks when applied to the setting with limited supply. Our high-level conceptual contribution is that even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully treated as a bandit problem.
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer's goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that (approximately) maximizes the social welfare. If the advertisers bid their true private values, our problem is equivalent to the "multi-armed bandit problem", and thus can be viewed as a strategic version of the latter. In particular, for both problems the quality of an algorithm can be characterized by "regret", the difference in social welfare between the algorithm and the benchmark which always selects the same "best" advertisement. We investigate how the design of multi-armed bandit algorithms is affected by the restriction that the resulting mechanism must be truthful. We find that truthful mechanisms have certain strong structural properties -- essentially, they must separate exploration from exploitation -- and they incur much higher regret than the optimal multi-armed bandit algorithms. Moreover, we provide a truthful mechanism which (essentially) matches our lower bound on regret.